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A short account of 1953 Coup Operation code-name: TP-AJAX Coup 53 of Iran is the CIA's (Central Intelligence Agency) first successful overthrow of a foreign government. But a copy of the agency's secret history of the coup has surfaced, revealing the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979, and for a generation of anti-American hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries. The document, which remains classified, discloses the pivotal role British intelligence officials played in initiating and planning the coup, and it shows that Washington and London shared an interest in maintaining the West's control over Iranian oil.
The operation, code-named TP-AJAX, was the blueprint for a succession of CIA plots to foment coups and destabilize governments during the cold war - including the agency's successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the disastrous Cuban intervention known as the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In more than one instance, such operations led to the same kind of long-term animosity toward the United States that occurred in Iran. The history says agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement, sent a stream of envoys to bolster the shah's courage, directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party, and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers. But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, CIA officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government. Two days after the coup, the history discloses, agency officials funneled $5 million to Iran to help the government they had installed consolidate power. Dr. Donald N. Wilber, an expert in Persian architecture, who as one of the leading planners believed that covert operatives had much to learn from history, wrote the secret history, along with operational assessments in March 1954. In less expansive memoirs published in 1986, Dr. Wilber asserted that the Iran coup was different from later CIA efforts. Its American planners, he said, had stirred up considerable unrest in Iran, giving Iranians a clear choice between instability and supporting the shah. The move to oust the prime minister, he wrote, thus gained substantial popular support. Dr. Wilber's memoirs were heavily censored by the agency, but he was allowed to refer to the existence of his secret history. "If this history had been read by the planners of the Bay of Pigs," he wrote, "there would have been no such operation." "From time to time," he continued, "I gave talks on the operation to various groups within the agency, and, in hindsight, one might wonder why no one from the Cuban desk ever came or read the history." The coup was a turning point in modern Iranian history and remains a persistent irritant in Tehran-Washington relations. It consolidated the power of the shah, who ruled with an iron hand for 26 more years in close contact with the United States. He was toppled by Iranian Revolution of 1979. Later that year, "Students of Imam Line" went to the American Embassy, took diplomats hostage and declared that they had unmasked a "nest of spies" who had been manipulating Iran for decades. The Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini supported terrorist attacks against American interests largely because of the long American history of supporting the shah's suppressive regime. Even under more moderate rulers, many Iranians still resent the United States' role in the coup and its support of the shah. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in an address, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before. "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons," she said. "But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs." The history spells out the calculations to which Dr. Albright referred in her speech. Britain, it says, initiated the plot in 1952. The Truman administration rejected it, but President Eisenhower approved it shortly after taking office in 1953, because of fears about oil and Communism. The document pulls few punches, acknowledging at one point that the agency baldly lied to its British allies. Dr. Wilber reserves his most withering asides for the agency's local allies, referring to "the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner."
The coup had its roots in a British showdown with Iran, restive under decades of near-colonial British domination. The prize was Iran's oil fields. Britain occupied Iran in World War II to protect a supply route to its ally, the Soviet Union, and to prevent the oil from falling into the hands of the Nazis - ousting the shah's father, whom it regarded as unmanageable. It retained control over Iran's oil after the war through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1951, Iran's Parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, and legislators backing the law elected its leading advocate, Dr. Mosaddeq, as prime minister. Britain responded with threats and sanctions. Dr. Mosaddeq, a European-educated lawyer then in his early 70's, prone to tears and outbursts, refused to back down. In meetings in November and December 1952, the secret history says, British intelligence officials startled their American counterparts with a plan for a joint operation to oust the nettlesome prime minister. The Americans, who "had not intended to discuss this question at all," agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there. In March 1953, an unexpected development pushed the plot forward: the CIA's Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had approached the American Embassy about supporting an army-led coup. The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration was intrigued. The coalition that elected Dr. Mosaddeq was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active. Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, approved $1 million on April 4 to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddeq," the history says. "The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party." Within days agency officials identified a high-ranking officer, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, as the man to spearhead a coup. Their plan called for the shah to play a leading role. "A shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mosaddeq," officials wrote, "particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mosaddeq's orders." But according to the history, planners had doubts about whether the shah could carry out such a bold operation. His family had seized Iran's throne just 32 years earlier, when his powerful father led a coup of his own. But the young shah, agency officials wrote, was "by nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears," often at odds with his family, including Princess Ashraf, his "forceful and scheming twin sister." Also, the shah had what the CIA termed a "pathological fear" of British intrigues, a potential obstacle to a joint operation. In May 1953 the agency sent Dr. Wilber to Cyprus to meet Norman Darbyshire, chief of the Iran branch of British intelligence, to make initial coup plans. Assuaging the fears of the shah was high on their agenda; a document from the meeting said he was to be persuaded that the United States and Britain "consider the oil question secondary." The conversation at the meeting turned to a touchy subject, the identity of key agents inside Iran. The British said they had recruited two brothers named Rashidian. The Americans, the secret history discloses, did not trust the British and lied about the identity of their best "assets" inside Iran. CIA officials were divided over whether the plan drawn up in Cyprus could work. The Tehran station warned headquarters that the "the shah would not act decisively against Mosaddeq." And it said General Zahedi, the man picked to lead the coup, "appeared lacking in drive, energy and concrete plans." Despite the doubts, the agency's Tehran station began disseminating "gray propaganda," passing out anti-Mosaddeq cartoons in the streets and planting unflattering articles in the local press. First Few Days Look Disastrous The coup began on the night of Aug. 15 and was immediately compromised by a talkative Iranian Army officer whose remarks were relayed to Mr. Mosaddeq. The operation, the secret history says, "still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture." Dr. Mosaddeq's chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi, learned of the plot hours before it was to begin and sent his deputy to the barracks of the Imperial Guard. The deputy was arrested there, according to the history, just as pro-shah soldiers were fanning out across the city arresting other senior officials. Telephone lines between army and government offices were cut, and the telephone exchange was occupied. But phones inexplicably continued to function, which gave Dr. Mosaddeq's forces a key advantage. General Riahi also eluded the pro-shah units, rallying commanders to the prime minister's side. Pro-shah soldiers sent to arrest Dr. Mosaddeq at his home were instead captured. The top military officer working with General Zahedi fled when he saw tanks and loyal government soldiers at army headquarters. The next morning, the history states, the Tehran radio announced that a coup against the government had failed, and Dr. Mosaddeq scrambled to strengthen his hold on the army and key installations. CIA officers inside the embassy were flying blind; the history says they had "no way of knowing what was happening." Mr. Roosevelt left the embassy and tracked down General Zahedi, who was in hiding north of Tehran. Surprisingly, the general was not ready to abandon the operation. The coup, the two men agreed, could still work, provided they could persuade the public that General Zahedi was the lawful prime minister. To accomplish this, the history discloses, the coup plotters had to get out the news that the shah had signed the two decrees. The CIA station in Tehran sent a message to The Associated Press in New York, asserting that "unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the shah, one dismissing Mosaddeq and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him." The CIA and its agents also arranged for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers, the history says. The propaganda initiative quickly bogged down. Many of the CIA's Iranian agents were under arrest or on the run. That afternoon, agency operatives prepared a statement from General Zahedi that they hoped to distribute publicly. But they could not find a printing press that was not being watched by forces loyal to the prime minister. On Aug. 16, prospects of reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly a fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had bolted to Baghdad. CIA headquarters cabled Tehran urging Mr. Roosevelt, the station chief, to leave immediately. He did not agree, insisting that there was still "a slight remaining chance of success," if the shah would broadcast an address on the Baghdad radio and General Zahedi took an aggressive stand. The first sign that the tide might turn came with reports that Iranian soldiers had broken up Tudeh, or Communist, groups, beating them and making them chant their support for the shah. "The station continued to feel that the project was not quite dead," the secret history recounts. Meanwhile, Dr. Mosaddeq had overreached, playing into the CIA's hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup. On the morning of Aug. 17 the shah finally announced from Baghdad that he had signed the decrees - though he had by now delayed so long that plotters feared it was too late. At this critical point Dr. Mosaddeq let down his guard. Lulled by the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers involved in the coup, the government recalled most troops it had stationed around the city, believing that the danger had passed.
They agreed to start a counterattack on Aug. 19, sending a leading cleric from Tehran to the holy city of Qom to try to orchestrate a call for a holy war against Communism. (The religious forces they were trying to manipulate would years later call the United States "the Great Satan.") Using travel papers forged by the CIA, key army officers went to outlying army garrisons to persuade commanders to join the coup. Once again, the shah disappointed the CIA He left Baghdad for Rome the next day, apparently an exile. Newspapers supporting Dr. Mosaddeq reported that the Pahlavi dynasty had come to an end, and a statement from the Communist Party's central committee attributed the coup attempt to "Anglo-American intrigue." Demonstrators ripped down imperial statues -- as they would again 26 years later during the Islamic revolution. The CIA station cabled headquarters for advice on whether to "continue with TP-AJAX or withdraw." "Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair," the history states, adding, "The message sent to Tehran on the night of Aug. 18 said that 'the operation has been tried and failed,' and that 'in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary operations against Mosaddeq should be discontinued'." CIA and Moscow Are Both Surprised
"They needed only leadership," the secret history says. And Iranian agents of the CIA provided it. Without specific orders, a journalist who was one of the agency's most important Iranian agents led a crowd toward Parliament, inciting people to set fire to the offices of a newspaper owned by Dr. Mosaddeq's foreign minister. Another Iranian CIA agent led a crowd to sack the offices of pro-Tudeh papers. "The news that something quite startling was happening spread at great speed throughout the city," the history states. The CIA tried to exploit the situation, sending urgent messages that the Rashidian brothers and two key American agents should "swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators." But things were now moving far too quickly for the agency to manage. An Iranian Army colonel who had been involved in the plot several days earlier suddenly appeared outside Parliament with a tank, while members of the now-disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. "By 10:15 there were pro-shah truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares," the secret history says. By noon the crowds began to receive direct leadership from a few officers involved in the plot and some who had switched sides. Within an hour the central telegraph office fell, and telegrams were sent to the provinces urging a pro-shah uprising. After a brief shootout, police headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell as well. The Tehran radio remained the biggest prize. With the government's fate uncertain, it was broadcasting a program on cotton prices. But by early afternoon a mass of civilians, army officers and policemen overwhelmed it. Pro-shah speakers went on the air, broadcasting the coup's success and reading the royal decrees. At the embassy, CIA officers were elated, and Mr. Roosevelt got General Zahedi out of hiding. An army officer found a tank and drove him to the radio station, where he spoke to the nation. Dr. Mosaddeq and other government officials were rounded up, while officers supporting General Zahedi placed "known supporters of TP-AJAX" in command of all units of the Tehran garrison. The Soviet Union was caught completely off-guard. Even as the Mosaddeq government was falling, the Moscow radio was broadcasting a story on "the failure of the American adventure in Iran." But CIA headquarters was as surprised as Moscow. When news of the coup's success arrived, it "seemed to be a bad joke, in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before," the history says. Throughout the day, Washington got most of its information from news agencies, receiving only two cablegrams from the station. Mr. Roosevelt later explained that if he had told headquarters what was going on, "London and Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately," the history states. Still, the CIA took full credit inside the government. The following year it overthrew the government of Guatemala, and a myth developed that the agency could topple governments anywhere in the world. Iran proved that third world king making could be heady. "It was a day that should never have ended," the CIA's secret history said, describing Aug. 19, 1953. "For it carried with it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether any other can come up to it."
Except for Reza Shah Pahlavi founder of modern Iran and Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, father of its revolution, no leader has left a deeper mark on Iran's 20th century landscape than Mohammad Mosaddeq. And no 20th century event has fuelled Iran's suspicion of the United States as his overthrow has. An eccentric European-educated lawyer whose father was a bureaucrat and whose mother descended from Persian kings, Dr. Mosaddeq served as a minister and governor before he opposed Reza Shah's accession in the 1920's. He was imprisoned and then put under house arrest at his estate in the walled village of Ahmadabad west of Tehran. Eventually he bought the village, growing crops, founding an elementary school and beginning a public health project. When Britain and Russia forced Reza Shah from power in favour of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in 1941, Dr. Mosaddeq became a member of Parliament. He was hailed as a hero for his fiery speeches on the evils of British control of Iran's oil industry. In 1951, when Parliament voted to nationalize the industry, the young shah, recognizing the nationalists' popularity, appointed Dr. Mosaddeq prime minister. In that job he became a prisoner of his own nationalism, unable to reach an oil compromise. Even as the British negotiated with Iran, they won the support of the major oil companies in imposing an effective global boycott on Iranian oil. Still, in the developing world Dr. Mosaddeq became an icon of anti-imperialism. He was revered despite his odd mannerisms, which included conducting business in bed in grey woollen pyjamas, weeping publicly and complaining perpetually of poor health. He amassed power. When the shah refused his demand for control of the armed forces in 1952, Dr. Mosaddeq resigned, only to be reinstated in the face of popular riots. He then displayed a streak of authoritarianism, bypassing Parliament by conducting a national referendum to win approval for its dissolution. Meanwhile, the United States became alarmed at the strength of Iran's Communist Party, which supported Dr. Mosaddeq. In August 1953, a dismissal attempt by the shah sent Dr. Mosaddeq's followers into the streets. The shah fled, amid fears in the new Eisenhower administration that Iran might move too close to Moscow. Yet Dr. Mosaddeq did not promote the interests of the Communists, though he drew on their support. Paradoxically, the party turned from him in the end because it viewed him as insufficiently committed and too close to the United States. By the time the royalist coup overthrew him after a few chaotic days, he had alienated many landowners, clerics and merchants.
When the revolution brought the clerics to power in 1979, anti-shah nationalists tried to revive Dr. Mosaddeq's memory. A Tehran thoroughfare called Pahlavi Avenue was renamed Mosaddeq Avenue. But Ayatollah Khomeini saw him as a promoter not of Islam but of Persian nationalism, and envied his popularity. So Mosaddeq Avenue became Vali Asr, after the revered Hidden Imam, whose reappearance someday, Shiite Muslims believe, will establish the perfect Islamic political community. Still, even Ayatollah Khomeini was careful not to go too far. Ignoring Dr. Mosaddeq, rather than excoriating him, became the rule. Two decades later, the Mosaddeq cult has been revitalized by resurgent nationalism and frustration with the strictures of Islam. Dr. Mosaddeq inspires the young, who long for heroes and have not necessarily found them, either in clerics or kings. In campaigns for local elections in February 1999 and parliamentary elections a year later, reformist advertising made use of Dr. Mosaddeq's sad, elongated face. And every year since his death, his supporters have rallied at his estate. His legacy still stirs considerable debate. In August, Parliament approved a bill to abolish a holiday marking the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. The decision set off protests in the press "Alas! Parliament ignored the most apparent symbol of the struggle of the Iranian people throughout history against colonialism," the reformist daily Khordad said. In November, legislators were forced to reinstate the holiday. CIA Tried, With Little Success, to Use U.S. Press in Coup Central Intelligence Agency officials plotting the 1953 coup in Iran hoped to plant articles in American newspapers saying Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's return resulted from a home-grown revolt against a Communist-leaning government, internal agency documents show. Those hopes were largely disappointed. The CIA's history of the coup shows that its operatives had only limited success in manipulating American reporters and that none of the Americans covering the coup worked for the agency. An analysis of the press coverage shows that American journalists filed straightforward, factual dispatches that prominently mentioned the role of Iran's Communists in street violence leading up to the coup. Western correspondents in Iran and Washington never reported that some of the unrest had been stage-managed by CIA agents posing as Communists. And they gave little emphasis to accurate contemporaneous reports in Iranian newspapers and on the Moscow radio asserting that Western powers were secretly arranging the shah's return to power. It was just eight years after the end of World War II, which left American journalists with a sense of national interest framed by six years of confrontation between the Allies and the Axis. The front pages of Western newspapers were dominated by articles about the new global confrontation with the Soviet Union, about Moscow's prowess in developing nuclear weapons and about Congressional allegations of "Red" influence in Washington. In one instance, the history indicates, the CIA was apparently able to use contacts at The Associated Press to put on the news wire a statement from Tehran about royal decrees that the CIA itself had written. But mostly, the agency relied on less direct means to exploit the media. The Iran desk of the State Department, the document says, was able to place a CIA study in Newsweek, "using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist." The article was one of several planted press reports that, when reprinted in Tehran, fed the "war of nerves" against Iran's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. The history says the Iran operation exposed the agency's shortcomings in manipulating the American press. The CIA "lacked contacts capable of placing material so that the American publisher was unwitting as to its source." The history discloses that a CIA officer, working under cover as the embassy's press officer, drove two American reporters to a house outside Tehran where they were shown the shah's decrees dismissing the prime minister. Kennett Love, the New York Times reporter in Tehran during the coup, wrote about the royal decrees in the newspaper the next day, without mentioning how he had seen them. In an interview, he said he had agreed to the embassy official's ground rules that he should not report the American role in arranging the trip. Mr. Love said he did not know at the time that the official worked for the CIA. After the coup succeeded, Mr. Love did in one article briefly refer to Iranian press reports of American involvement, and The New York Times also published an article from Moscow reporting Soviet charges that the United States was behind the coup. But neither The Times nor other American news organizations appear to have examined such charges seriously. In a 1960 paper he wrote while studying at Princeton University, Mr. Love explained that he "was responsible, in an impromptu sort of way, for speeding the final victory of the royalists." Seeing a half-dozen tanks parked in front of Tehran's radio station, he said, "I told the tank commanders that a lot of people were getting killed trying to storm Dr. Mosaddeq's house and that they would be of some use instead of sitting idle at the radio station." He added, "They took their machines in a body to Kakh Avenue and put the three tanks at Dr. Mosaddeq's house out of action." Mr. Love, who left The New York Times in 1962, said in an interview that he had urged the tanks into action "because I wanted to stop the bloodshed." Months afterward, Mr. Love says, he was told by Robert C. Doty, then Cairo bureau chief and his boss, of evidence of American involvement in the coup. But Mr. Doty, who died in 1974, did not write about the matter, and by the summer of 1954, Mr. Love decided to tell the New York office what he knew. In a July 26, 1954, letter to Emanuel R. Freedman, then the foreign editor, Mr. Love wrote, "The only instance since I joined The Times in which I have allowed policy to influence a strict news approach was in failing to report the role our own agents played in the overthrow of Mosaddeq." Mr. Love said he had hoped that the foreign editor would order him to pursue the subject. But he never received any response, he said. "I wanted to let Freedman know that I knew there had been U.S. involvement in the coup, but that I hadn't written about it," he said. "I expected him to say, 'Jump on that story.' But there was no response." Mr. Freedman died in 1971. 'Gentleman Spy' Donald Wilber, who planned the coup in Iran and wrote its secret history, was old-school CIA, a Princetonian and a Middle East architecture expert who fit neatly into the mold of the "gentleman spy." Years of wandering through Middle Eastern architectural sites gave him the perfect cover for a clandestine life. By 1953, he was an obvious choice as the operation's strategist. The coup was the high point of his life as a spy. Although he would excel in academia, at the agency being part-time was a handicap. "I never requested promotion, and was given only one, after the conclusion of AJAX," Dr. Wilber wrote of the Iran operation. On his last day, "I was ushered down to the lobby by a young secretary, turned over my badge to her and left." He added, "This treatment rankled for some time. I did deserve the paperweight." Donald Wilber died in 1997 at 89. taken from Iran Chamber Society http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p3.php |
29 comments:
As an Iranian-American, I am ashamed to say that I am not fully informed about the coup of Mossadegh. I have heard from many how it did a great injustice to the people of Iran. Considering Mossadegh was democratically elected by the people and had socialistic views of distributing the wealth amongst the people, I wonder how US-Iranian relations would have been like if the US hadn't taken on a direct role in taking down Mossadegh? Could their ties have turned into one of peace where both sides benefited? In reading this article I was astounded by the extent of US involvement in the coup. What gave the US the authority to override a people's wants and give them a leader who they knew would strip his own land of its natural wealth in order to benefit the west? As is mentioned in the article, this form of meddling in other countries' issues is not foreign or new to the US. Was there no one or way of stopping the obvious meddling in foreign affairs for their own economic and political gain?
This week's reading is particularly useful in providing an overview of Operation AJAX. American, British and Iranian collaboration in the operation were all key to explaining the success of the coup. Each political actor in the coup seems to have been preoccupied by their own particular set of motivations be it access to Iranian oil, "containment of communism", or gaining political power in Iran. I am particularly interested in whether the Shah even possessed the legal authority to dismiss Mossadegh from power. I also wonder if Eisenhower would have approved of the coup had he not been pressured by the combined counsel of the Dulles brothers to authorize the operation. Whatever the answers to these questions might be, knowing the history of the coup helps to illuminate the sour relations between Iran and the US today. The coup may also explain why Iranians took Americans hostage following the 1979 revolution. In sum, a good read for anyone interested in the history of US-Iranian relations!
What if the Iranian general who told the American embassy that he would help with the coup was not even truly a supporter of it in the sense of being representative of other Iranians' beliefs but was simply paid/coerced/persuaded/etc. by the British in an attempt to further persuade the U.S.? What would make the U.S. support the coup more than citizens of the actual country supporting it?
It is also a bit ironic that the history states that "the aim [of the coup] was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent..." when this whole time, Mosaddeq was trying to do that through nationalizing the oil industry. I guess the main point of that statement is the "equitable oil settlement" part. Whereas Mosaddeq was primarily concerned with Iran's economy and the proper oil money going to the country, the U.S. and British were probably concerned about the oil revenue being "equitable" with them in mind.
Also, how did the coup change from being primarily a British operation to an American one? The British were the ones who had the most at stake monetarily, yet it later appears to be mostly the Americans having to actually do most of the carrying out of the coup and take most of the blame for the actual outcomes. I'm not discounting what the Americans did. I'm just wondering how the main objectives ended up changing hands and if fighting the spread of Communism truly was that strong of an argument for taking such a risky (at least in hindsight when you consider the implications: the Revolution of 1979 and subsequent "anti-American" sentiments etc.) coup.
I think it is quite amusing that the CIA 's chief coupe planner commented that the coupe against Mossadegh was "mostly a matter of chance." It is obvious that the plot was carefully planned out, from the sneaky propaganda to the delicate placing of civilian actors as communists. Like feeding candy to a child, the US had no problem tightening the reins and assigning the Shah into power like a puppet on strings.
I also find the story of Britain intruding on Irans oil revenue quite interesting. Britain complied with Iran in oil treaties so that the precious treasure wouldn't be in the hands of the enemies, aka the Soviets and Nazis. However, after the war ended Britain refused to share the major profits from the oil, leaving Iran in an economic crisis. Was it so wrong for the civilians of Iran to democratically elect a man who wished to nationalize the oil in a fair manner? So what if the British were a few billions of dollars less rich?
I often wonder how different the country of Iran would be if the British did not get involved in their oil revenue. I also wonder how the international affairs would have turned out if Mossadegh was left in power? Who knows, Iran and the United States may now be better off friends, as opposed to sworn enemies.
The west's dependence on foreign oil from the middle east has caused it numerous problems. For example its support of the unpopular government in Saudi Arabia and intrusion in Iraq. I fault the U.S. for attempting the coup for its own interests but also the Mossadegh government for not being more strongly established. Such a coup with some ragtag hired mobs would have never worked in a country like the U.S. for example. If Mossadegh had been able to inform his country of western influence rather than dictatorially cracking down on the protests (and engendering more sentiment against him) I think he could have possibly stopped the coup. Its interesting that he became the TIME person of the year in 1951 for defying the west yet that kind of recognition still did not stop the coup. Although negative I do not believe that Iran under Mossadegh would have been totally better off; at least the newfound Western position in the region warded off other threats. For example the soviets could have intruded.
This is definitely a topic I knew little about, detail wise. It seems odd that since it wasn't the most smooth of operations, the CIA would be so eager to carry out others based on the model (this drawn from the bay of pigs parallel cited in the article). The only thing I couldn't figure out was whether or not the CIA wanted people to know about their involvement. The section talking about their attempt to infiltrate the media made it sound almost as though they did, but other sections talked about them attempting to anonymously insert articles without their sources being known. As though they couldn't decide whether or not they wanted credit for their dirty work?
The involvement of overall Americans in the coup is fascinating. It is not surprising to see that Kennet Love didn't get a response to report at full length what he knew of this involvement, especially his own in issuing tanks at Mosaddeq's house. The intricacies of however the U.S. aided the coup are not to be lost in the history of the coups causes. To remain neutral and objective, and to see it as a huge wave in Iranian history, I would have to say that much of this was caused by both British avarice for oil and also the response of Mosaddeq nationalizing oil. When the British moved to boycott Iranian sources with other companies this put the clinch in the closing of all possible conversation, and gave birth to more antipathy between (at least how the CIA propogandized) Axis and Allies. The communist sentiment extant, and Mosaddeq's involvement in using them as resources for his political stances cemented the imminent, and nonetheless misplaced "involvement" of the CIA. However large their failure was in overturning "communism" does not take away from the fact almost all salient U.S. involvement was overlooked. Therefore, when Iran became so repugnant toward the U.S. it surprised many common Americans because the general survey of involvement in circulation was either the hyperbole of the CIA or the way in which Mosaddeq was coveting oil wanted by the West. Mosaddeq, as a result, is percieved as a hero to much of the youth culture, as someone who stands for anti-imperialism.
The involvement of overall Americans in the coup is fascinating. It is not surprising to see that Kennet Love didn't get a response to report at full length what he knew of this involvement, especially his own in issuing tanks at Mosaddeq's house. The intricacies of however the U.S. aided the coup are not to be lost in the history of the coups causes. To remain neutral and objective, and to see it as a huge wave in Iranian history, I would have to say that much of this was caused by both British avarice for oil and also the response of Mosaddeq nationalizing oil. When the British moved to boycott Iranian sources with other companies this put the clinch in the closing of all possible conversation, and gave birth to more antipathy between (at least how the CIA propogandized) Axis and Allies. The communist sentiment extant, and Mosaddeq's involvement in using them as resources for his political stances cemented the imminent, and nonetheless misplaced "involvement" of the CIA. However large their failure was in overturning "communism" does not take away from the fact almost all salient U.S. involvement was overlooked. Therefore, when Iran became so repugnant toward the U.S. it surprised many common Americans because the general survey of involvement in circulation was either the hyperbole of the CIA or the way in which Mosaddeq was coveting oil wanted by the West. Mosaddeq, as a result, is percieved as a hero to much of the youth culture, as someone who stands for anti-imperialism.
After reading this article I have a better understanding of why the United States, along with a majority of the western world, perseveres a negative connotation when dealing with political matters in the Middle East. It seems as if the coup of 1953 was constructed and supported by foreign powers for cynical reasons. Although the western governments had specific agendas that led the actions that took place, this particular incident in history typifies the political paranoia of communism in the 50s and the greed that still exist today with the fight for oil. I would consider this a mistake on the behalf of the United States when dealing with political decisions and foreign affairs. However, mistakes happen, but it does not make sense the way that the United States continued to do other coups like the one in Guatemala. I'm really glad to learn about such historical like this because it informs me on the political problems that take place around the world. However, today I feel ashamed and truly saddened by the way that the United States did such things after being recognized as a a leader and world power after the WWII. I believe that the United States should take further precautionary measures and responsibility for the political decisions they make as a world leader and always remember at the end of day they are dealing with the lives of human beings.
I remember learning about the Guatemalan coup in my Southern Border class last fall and it's interesting to find out how the US learned how to overthrow a government so effectively. The CIA's actions were very similar in the Guatemalan coup but it wasn't about oil there. It was about farm land. The interesting thing is, in both the Guatemalan coup and the Iranian coup, the US used Communist scare tactics to persuade people that the overthrow of the government was the right thing to do. Also in both cases, the CIA hid its role in secrecy and pretended that the people of the countries were the ones promoting it. In both cases, it seems the manipulation of the media was a powerful tool in deterring enough people from fighting against the coup.
After reading this article I got a better understanding of international relations between Iran and other countries, like Britain and the United States. When I read the Time article, Iran was portrayed as an ideal place to live, where the Shah was focused on the good of the people. Iran seemed like a problem-free country. However, once I read this article, it gave me a more realistic view of the conflicts that occurred in Iran. After reading about how the United States became involved in overthrowing Mossadegh, I came to understand why Iran and the United States were not in such good terms. I feel like due to the instability of the Iranian government, other countries took advantage of that and tried to control and manipulate Iran. Same with the British who tried to take control of the Iranian oil. After reading about the unnecessary involvement of Britain and the US in Iran, I now see and understand why Iran was a bit resentful towards us. I must agree that it is interesting to think how different everything would have been if the US would have not become involved in Iranian government conflicts.
I think it's interesting, and I echo some people who have mentioned this before, how it seems as if the coup seemed to change from being primarily British to American. Wasn't it the case that the British had a lot to care for in Iran, and were there prior to the Americans? And if the British did play a role in the coup as well, it is not apparent why their responsibility is downplayed. In one of the youtube videos that we watched, the commentator mentioned that the coup was engineered by the CIA, without mentioning the MI6, which I thought was interesting.
There were also the accusations of Mossadegh being associated with communism, and I'm still not actually very sure how that association came about. That aside, it seems as if the article downplays the importance of the role of Mossadegh's authoritative crackdowns on the population when he was in power. I'm pretty certain that his authoritarian streak, however short it may be, would have had a pretty significant impact, and played a non-trivial role in the receptivity of the people to the incitations of the CIA.
I think what struck me most about this article was its focus on the shoddiness of the coup plan. Its details of the plans held in contrast to what happened in actuality are shocking and make one wonder how the coup could possibly have been successful. But a series of perfect circumstances precipitated the result that Britain and America wanted--however off course from the game plan it was.
I found it interesting to see the initial distrust and disagreements between the U.S. and Britain, as well as the desparate search for leading figures to head the coup within the country. Apparently the C.I.A. was disappointed by the Iranian operatives who could hardly get a cohesive plan together. From the early leaks to the mid-point losses--it looked apparent to most that this plan would not succeed. Yet with the Shah's late support from his Baghdad exile and Mossadegh's loosened military presence within and around the capital, the momentum of the coup was regained and the right players and sequesnce of events came into play--igniting a complex situation where the people were forced to make the "clear choice between instability and supporting the shah."
I think this article provides an detailed timeline as well as information that were kept behind the scene. In Chinese, there's an old saying, "possessing the jade is a crime by itself." It is from an old story about how the emperor framed an innocent man who found a perfectly pure and beautiful jade in order to steal it from him. Clearly, the UK and the US governments were involved in this matter because of their interest for oil. If we put everything in context, it is clearly about gaining control of one of the most important natural resources rather than helping the Iranian people. We hear about Iran's nuclear projects and how it is becoming an increasingly important nation in the balance and stability of the middle east. But what we don't realize is that the negative image of Iran is created by the major medias for political reasons.
I remember asking my mom about Dr. Mossadegh after lecture two weeks ago and she said that he was one of the only leaders in Iran who truly cared about what the people wanted. After reading this article, it became obvious to me that the coup of Mossadegh represented much more than a shift in power from the prime minister to an American puppet; it represented a complete transformation of the image of the United States in the eyes of the Iranian citizens. The amount of effort that the U.S put into overthrowing Mossadegh really created this enormous sense of distrust between Iranians and Americans and I feel like that distrust is still seen today. Throughout the article there was an overall theme presented about the personalities of the two leaders, portraying Mossadegh as a brave, headstrong man and the Shah as a somewhat naïve, insecure puppet. It felt as if these proposed personalities reflected the type of reign that each of these men ran in Iran. It is a shame that the one man who foresaw a great future for Iran had to be removed by the American government due to the fear that he believed that Iran’s interests came in front of American interests.
It’s pretty amazing to look back in history and realize all the problems and the mess that countries like the United States and Britain have caused for fear of Communism. In Iran for example, the revolution to put the Shah in power was started where a lot of people died. This is very ironic because the US did this supposedly to prevent the bad guys--Communists--from having control of areas like the middle east.
The US sent its CIA into many countries and caused more deaths and suffering than Communism. But did the US went into places like Iran and Cuba to prevent Communism? At least that was the preached reason. Now a days I think it’s called spreading democracy like it was the case with Iraq.
It’s also scary to think that the people of the most powerful, richest country can be so easily manipulated into getting involved into this kind of occupations and so easily fooled into what is the reality of things. And even the Americans who are discontent with the wrongful actions the country is takes remain quietly in discontent.
In addition, what is the role of the media these days? It is of no use to have journalism if is going to work for the interest of governments. It serves no purpose if it is going to be so easily manipulated.
The rule of Mossadegh seemed to be legitimate as he was democratically elected by the people. The Soviet Union influence must have been strong because of the socialist reforms that Mossadegh attempted to distribute the wealth evenly amongst the people. However, the U.S. CIA exploitation thwarted this as they were greatly involved in the coup and overthrow of the socialist agenda. It was interesting how negatively the article made the U.S. out to be. I guess it makes sense considering the fact that the U.S. coup was carefully planned with propaganda and their placement of the Shah in the government. Mossadegh seemed to be protecting his state's main source of wealth, oil, from the exploitation of Britain and America with his anti-imperialist views. I definitely have a jaded impression of American involvement in Iran after readin this article. I feel that since a legitimate government is decided by the people, illegitimate government must come from an outside influence, the West. A coup like this never would have worked in America, but the Mossadegh government wasn't well established and supported making it easily corrupted by outside forces.
The immense involvement of the west is one of the most essential pieces in understanding the coup of 1953, for, as has already been said numerous times, Mossadegh was a democratically elected leader with progressive views about government that seems fit for the time and circumstance.
The two key players from the west were the British and the US, both heavily reliant on foreign oil, and both with a vested interest in the leadership of Iran for this reason. The article outlines (fairly longwindedly) the different types of propaganda and espionage that allowed for western meddling.
This is one of the earlier instances of western hostility towards Iran, and is deeply suggestive about the roots of contemporary conservative or radical islamist leadership and their resistance of normalized relations with western countries in general, but with the US in particular.
I felt this article provided a substantial account of the Iranian coup and rightfully showed that it was indeed a pivotal point in Iranian history. In 1953, the Iran and British partnership successfully removed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. As it was later revealed that the motive behind the coup was the British and American interest in Iran's oil supply. In return, Iran would be enabled to now become economically stable and financially able to act as a counter to the popular Communist party. As others have said in the past, it is very interesting to think that a Mosaddeq, a democratically elected official was overthrown by a western agency who are themselves governed by a democratic entity. It is interesting when a democratic action like nationalizing Iran's oil supply could effect other world powers in such a selfish manner. After reading this article, I can now begin to see why some claim Mosaddeq as the hero of the anti-imperialist.
Reading this article I felt sick to my stomach. I refused to believe that so many foreign actors had a role in overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian prime minister; the faith of Iran should have been placed in the hands of young Iranians, not in the hands of the American and British political elite. Moreover, I am in awe of how different Iran's history could have been if Mossadeq had not been overthrown.
The lesson I have taken away from the '53 coup is that cliched saying: "there is no black and white in the world, only shades of gray". Although I am sickened by the selfish motivation behind the US and British involvement in the coup, I understand that both of these countries were looking out for the best interests of their constituents. In this sense, their actions in setting up the coup can even be considered noble.
Even Mossadeq himself committed political sins; he rigged the results of a referendum in order to dissolve government. It can be argued though that he was doing so in order to keep stability in Iran.
In the end, I see that there is no one in the right and no one completely in the wrong. But as an Iranian, I wonder how much more my country could have developed had not been for these political and cultural stagnates.
I am still unable to completely fathom the events that occurred due to the actions of the CIA in 1953. The fact that because of oil interests, the CIA and MI6 were able to go into a country, overthrow a democratically elected leader who was looking out for the will of his country, and start false riots to place the Shah in power is simply astounding. Mossadeq was a leader elected by the people yet the fact that the oil hungry west wasn't getting their way caused them to actually stage a coup in a country. Under no just international law can that be morally, or just in general a right action. The US has been doing the same in Iraq for the past 6 years, citing false Al-Qaeda ties as the thirst for oil continues. I understand that this form of meddling is not new to the United States, but I believe that there should be limits to what a country can and cannot do.
Even 60 years later, the CIA continues to do unjust and corrupt things so it's not surprising that in 1953 they were able to overthrow a democratically elected leader. I think with this in mind, everyone should be able to understand why Iran and other countries in the region despise the United States. Iranians have it instilled in their minds that the United States acts as a sole superpower prancing around the world doing whatever they want, and frankly that is true to a certain extent. US foreign policy in the Middle East has always been one that holds Muslim countries to a double standard while the US continues to blindly black Israel on any decisions, even their nuclear arsenal. This only worsens the hate for the west and unless these actions stop one day, I'm sure the hate will turn into something much larger. I also wonder how much longer oil interests are going to be the main driving force behind government policy.
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