If you're interested about the beginnings of the Cold War in Iran, and want to hear a different view on operation ajax, read this article by Professor R.J. Rummel (same guy who created the term "democide") and comment on it.
-Amir
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R.J. Rummel’s blog entry about the coup that removed Mossadegh from power is an interesting take on the issue. It is clear that Rummel views the coup in Iran as simply another part of the Cold War. He applies the domino theory to the situation in Iran, suggesting that if Iran fell to communism, communism would spread to the other countries in the Middle East. Some of Rummel’s arguments seem very biased. He seems to view the crisis from the eyes of a determined Cold Warrior. He portrays it as a fight between communism and democracy, a situation in which Iran was inevitably going to fall to communists, a travesty, if the United States did not intervene and “save” it. However, there is evidence to suggest that more was at play in this situation. Rummel even quotes a CIA statement that counters his main argument. The statement says, “Specifically, the aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement…”. This suggests that oil interests were a primary motivator in the U.S. taking interest in Iran and constructing the coup.
During the Cold War, Americans became paranoid about the communist threat. Even within the U.S. itself, fear of communist penetration ran high and sometimes elicited unnecessary and excessive action. While it is possible that the government thought that Iran would be taken over by communists and that it was extremely important to prevent this, it also seems likely that the government was able to take advantage of this Cold War paranoia to portray what might have truly been a move to secure oil interests as a move to protect Iran from the communists. It seems that one’s interpretation of this episode depends heavily on if one buys into Cold War rhetoric. Rummel seems to believe in the idea of a global communist monolith, which many argue was a myth. The strong language that Rummel uses—“the United States saved Iran from Soviet domination,” and “American actions in Iran saved the country from communist enslavement”—reveals this bias. American policies in other countries during the Cold War era also suggest both that the United States was willing to support corrupt leaders as long as they were not communist, and that sometimes the government may have used the Cold War paranoia to its advantage. In the case of the Iran coup, we must remind ourselves not to get too caught up in the Cold War rhetoric so we can objectively evaluate if other interests, such as oil, played a role.
After reading R.J. Rummel’s perspective on what happened during the 1953 Iranian Coup, I felt that it was interesting and helpful to hear a different side to the story. I think that it is unfair to classify his point of view or tone as being biased, specifically with regards to the cold war. He is perfectly reasonable in his explanation for the US and the British’s worry about communist influence on Iran during this time. This is an issue of the cold war and arguably could be seen as a part of the war. While there was no combat fighting between the anti-communist countries and the USSR, the intentions of the USSR are clear in their gradual take over of Northern Iran and their influence on the ailing Premier, Mohammad Mossadeq and his government. When the oil embargo began on Iran after Mossadeq took office and privatized oil production for the his country, taking away control from the British, Iran’s economy was severely hurt. They were in a pinch and it was clear that Mossadeq was thinking about turning to the Soviets, who were more than whiling to buy their oil and not abide by the current embargo. While it is unfair to say for sure that Mossadeq would have turned to the Soviets in this situation, it was clear that with the pinch Mossadeq was feeling from his current economic situation and his fear for remaining in power, due to the fact that the citizens of Iran wanted to get out of their current economic problem, anything was possible.
R.J. Rummel’s piece is unique in that it gives insight into the time period and occurrences through the eyes of someone who was living during that time, during the time of the cold war. In current time people forget what this was like and some of the hard decision we had to make relative to the safety of the world and democracy itself. He brings up a good point when he refers to the fact that the United States did not overthrow a democratic government in order to be replaced by a dictator when he cites the “esteemed Gurr’s 1989 Polity II codings of political systems”. Lets not forget that Iran was strategically perfect for the USSR and with an impoverished country as well as a shaky political regime, the all-powerful USSR could have easily turned Iran into one of its satellite countries. History tells us that about 30 years later the Soviet Afghan War would begin, right in the back yard of Iran. This could be seen as a behind the scene look at what their incentives could have been.
While it is not up to any one country or group of countries to decided who should rule a country due to situations that are affecting them, it is safe to say the United States an Britain, who often takes little to no blame on the issue, instigated this coup for the good of the world, democracy and the Iranian people. Iran was in the middle of something bigger than itself; it was weak and had two sides and super powers towering over them on each side. Personally I would have liked to see the allied forces of democracy win support of the government, than Communist control. The Communists just don’t march their soldiers in and let you do what you want for the most part. The root of the problem was that the US and Britain wanted what was good for the Country of Iran and its people even if it meant relying on a return to power by the Shah who had a track record of governing Iran. On the other hand and historically proven might I add, the soviets were not interested in this. They would have used Iran for what it was worth to them and lined them up right along side with the helpless and silenced countries that acted as a shield for their motherland. In the end it was the people of Iran and its military that successfully staged the coup, not the United States and Britain. I feel there is a double standard and only bits and pieces of this coup are brought out as unconditional blame of the United States. The people of Iran had minds of their own and in the end it was not the US or British Military that instated the coup, it was the Iranian Military and the people themselves.
The credibility of Rummel's account paradoxically relies on discrediting the most popular explanation of Operation Ajax: that it was about the nationalization of Iranian oil. Rummel argues that Operation Ajax wasn't about the narrow pursuit of exclusive oil contracts, but rather the more lofty pursuit of democracy-promotion and halting the spread of Communism. Unfortunately, Rummel's argument does not successfully discredit the mainstream account; he merely attempts to gloss over this analysis rather than grappling it head on.
First he argues: "Just look at Iran on the map to see how critical it was to keep Iran aligned with the West during the Cold War. Even Iranian independence, if that could be assured, was enough." This means that Rummel believes that an independent Iran (one that, in his mind, would also be independent from Soviet control) was equally desirable for the US. The question is, then, why the US would choose to initiate a coup and reinstate the Shah, which precludes Iranian independence? The major determinant in this case is that an independent Iran would still choose to nationalize its oil, while a Shah-controlled Iran would not. Regardless of Rummel's rhetoric, the fact that oil played a role in CIA strategy can not be denied.
Additionally, Rummel points out that the goal of Operation Ajax was to institute a regime that was friendly to the US and uncooperative with the Soviet Union. But the only reason that the US believed that Iran under Mossadegh was not friendly to US interests is entirely because he nationalized Iranian oil. Rummel even concedes this: "according to what was a CIA report on the coup... events in Iran had aroused these fears: By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries..." Moreover, the CIA did not have any intelligence that indicated that Mossadegh would cooperate with the Soviet Union, and could have easily prevented such cooperation simply by becoming close allies with the Iranian government at the time--the US made this move repeatedly in the Cold War. But the US refused to initiate this alliance solely because of the nationalization of oil.
Furthermore, Rummel shows a surprising level of ignorance about the Cold War in general. He states that "American actions in Iran saved the country from communist enslavement -- surely the first time when Truman forced Soviet forces to withdraw, and probably a second time with the CIA coup." As Leffler's book "The Specter of Communism" argues, a reading of CIA accounts reveals that this is not true. US attempts to halt the spread of Communism didn't have to do with saving countries from "enslavement" or even democracy promotion--though this is made obvious simply by US backing of totalitarian dictators throughout the Cold War. Cold War strategy was, in actuality, predicated on ensuring that capitalist free trade could continue. The CIA believed that if the USSR gained control of a country, they would close off its markets to the US. They believed that such protectionist actions could hurt the US economy. Thus, Operation Ajax is consistent with Cold War politics not in the moralistic way that Rummel argues--but rather, because Iran was blocking US access to oil in a way the US believed would be detrimental to their economy. Rummel's attempts to divorce economic considerations from Operation Ajax is ignorant of the fact that Cold War strategy was precisely predicated on such considerations.
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