Hey guys. I'm sorry we couldn't finish the lecture today, its apparent that I talk too much.
This article is from the Economist, and it ties quite nicely into the contemporary Iranian government structure that we were talking about today. It also serves to give you guys a taste of what is to come in the future of the course.
Just read the article and give us your thoughts. You guys had some great comments this week so I trust that this will be interesting.
Good luck on midterms and see you next week.
-Amir
8 comments:
As part of last week's lecture, we reviewed Iran's government structure and it's muddled hierarchy. I recall seeing the model on the lecture slide and how I immediately began thinking about the apparent uneven balance of power.
This article points out that, despite ITS rulers' vaunting Iran's tendency toward democracy, that is so. It paints the role Supreme Leader's (SL) as that of an all-powerful entity which gives the impression of being a magnanimous leader presiding over a true democracy. As we saw in lecture, the Guardian Council (GC) is second in power to the SL, and though they are second, they are hand-picked by the SL. But even the GC has an unnatural amount of power, as the article says; the majlis passed legislation to limit the constitutional authority of the Guardian Council—which predictably rejected it. So, influence meted out by the GC is thus indirectly extending the power of the SL, thereby reducing the rest of the governmental bodies to rubber stamps.
But the hundreds of candidates still up for the vote, after the GC's disqualification process eliminated the rest, enable the public to have a say in matters, if only to a small degree. As the article says, practically nobody predicted Ahmadinejad's victory. There may be hope yet...
But there is a further uneven balance of power with the presidential incumbent's withholding of funds from the city of Tehran. Doing so because his likely opponent in the upcoming elections is the current mayor of Tehran. Although, it might be considered somewhat extreme to believe that this practice is tenaciously bound within the confines of Iran's Islamic Republic system.
What I particularly enjoyed about this article was that it had a much better understanding of the power structure within Iran, and as such could lend greater insight into the election process that is to take place. From what I read in the article, it seems that the Economist is doubtful another reformist like Khatami could mistakenly come into power again, but there does seem to be a belief that more practical leaders will be coming into power in parliament, many of whom lack a fervent revolutionary ideology. It seems that President Ahmadinejad has done the economy so much damage, that the people of Iran will vote for politicians that can turn the situation around in Iran, get the sanctions lifted, and the unemployment and inflation rate down. I think that right now, this is just what Iran needs—leaders who are going to bring practical change to the country.
With this article I also enjoyed the clear and concise understanding of the complicated workings of the Iranian government. What struck me as interesting was the gradual phase out of the reformists. the debates are no longer between the reformists and the conservatives but between the hard-line conservatives and the pragmatic conservatives. This illustrates the shift throughout Iranian politics towards a more conservative way of thinking.
However, the reformists have not totally melted into the background. After nearly one third of the candidates were disqualified for the election the Guardian Council reinstated them and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may ask them to reinstate more. This could be seen as an effort by the government to maintain democracy in Iran. But Khamenei will only do this to give "the impression of being a magnanimous leader presiding over a true democracy." He does not seem concerned with actually spreading true democracy in Iran, just giving off that impression. However, another thing this article highlights is the unpredictability of Iranian elections. So even though now there is "little hope of an electoral comeback" for the reformists things could look very different in five or ten years.
Government has never been an easy task for any country. Most countries in the world brag about having democracies but as we can see even the United States lacks this form of government. We have a two party system in which many independent candidates would not stand a chance and in which if you do not have millions of dollars in your bank account then you are not going far.
In Iran the system works differently, in many ways better than most countries. However, this does not mean that everything is perfect. Like any other place in the world their institutions are run by people who try to do a good job but end up making either mistakes or being influenced by higher ranking institutions or individuals.
Because the conflicts arise in every aspect of government there is no surprise that even the president has to look over his shoulder for the Supreme Leader's final call on whatever type of policy.
People's direct involvement in the steps that the government take is necessary to pressure the same and make them feel that they don't have absolute power. Within a few years we will see if this changes or not and many things will be cleared by the next presidential election.
The Economist seems to have a solid understanding of Iran's political system. It is hard to understand and even harder to describe. In Iran, there appears to be a window of democracy. This is a range of ideologies for which the people can vote. This range changes over time, and is dictated by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council.
The reduction of reformist candidates and voice appears to be a result of this. The Islamic leadership let the range of ideas shift gradually to reformism, and let Khatami slip by and into the presidency. It's very likely that they regretted this decision. They now appear to be taking more precautions, by limiting reformist voice in the elections. They have shifted or narrowed the scope of the election to conservatives and hardline conservatives.
The article suggests the hope of good, smart people being elected and bringing gradual change, but quantum leaps in Iran's government cannot be expected. The constant struggle between elected and unelected officials makes change difficult and gradual.
This article seems to elucidate the fact that the dominant ideology of Iranian politics, which includes foreign policy and Iran’s relations to the rest of the world, is mainly set by the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, which are unelected positions. Because this type of power is not extended to a great degree to the president or parliament, these two bodies must focus on practical issues that are more within their control. These issues include domestic policy, and in particular, economical issues.
Although reformists seem not to have much of a chance in the election, pragmatic conservatives would be better than hardliners for domestic policy and probably would be less stringent about social restrictions. While the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council have power over more enduring and international affairs, the economy is an area in which parliament (and the president) have influence and can take more pragmatic action.
Khatami’s presidency demonstrated the elected bodies’ lack of power to change Iran’s foreign policy and ultimate standing with other countries, but a more economically-focused agenda could propel Iran into a position where more people would have a stake in a democratic system and may demand more political rights in the long run. Economically downtrodden people don’t have the time, energy, or resources to concentrate as much on foreign affairs and civil rights as they do on survival; a strong economy could be the first step toward a more modern, democratic Iran.
The continuing dominance of unelected officials is of course a huge barrier to true democracy, but the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council aren’t going away anytime soon, so it makes sense to focus on things that can be changed, i.e. the economy, and to gradually work towards creating a more democratic society.
I agree that the economist article has a very good understanding of the structure and power distribution of the Iranian government. While unelected officials still largely control the system, there is still a notable democratic presence. With such a large number of checks on who’s running and what decisions are passed, however, I don’t see a fundamental change happening anytime in the future – which can be both good and bad. While the ability to disqualify presidential candidates ensures that radical politicians don’t change Iran for the worse, it also stunts much needed progress.
Considering that the structure is not likely to change any time soon, the only thing that one can do is to hope for gradual social change. And this seems very plausible considering the legacy that President Ahmadinejad has left, and the Iranians’ desire to fix the economy.
I agree with the Economist's assessment of Iran's political system as more complex than the initial guidelines and rules set in place for governance. What the article emphasized the most (as is shown in the subtitle) is the fade away of the reformists and the transformation of the political scene into the hard-line conservatives vs. the pragmatic conservatives. Though the article mentioned the 'democratic' aspect of the elections process, where in theory thousands of candidates are able to run, it followed by denying the legitimacy of this statement as 2,000 reformists were disqualified from the elections. This specific detail seems to play into the larger picture presented in the article, that no matter what kind of democracy Iran creates, politics ultimately lies in the hands of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, two unelected positions.
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