Iran: 30 Years of Revolution

2010-09-05T19:06:00.000-07:00

Hello!

This is the old Iran decal blog. The one that we will be using for Fall 2010 is located at :

iranastateofparadox.blogspot.com

Class Cancelled Today 11/30/09

2009-11-30T13:31:00.000-08:00

Hi all, I've come down with the Flu and am bed ridden. I won't be able to make it to class to lecture today. I will be posting a video and a few articles to go over the material for today. The rest of Nuclear Iran and the Green Revolution.

Sorry for the inconvenience

-Sammy

Essay Topics

2009-11-19T22:19:00.001-08:00

Iran: 30 Years of Revolution Decal

Final Paper Topics

Instructions: You must write a 3-5 page essay responding to one of the topics below. The essay must be double spaced, in 12 point Times New Roman font, with 1 inch margins. You must also have a cover page which will include your name, your student ID number, your blog screename, the number of the essay topic you are responding to, and the title of your essay. Additionally on the cover page you must also indicate which six postings you commented on in the blog. Giving the title of the posting is enough. In order to pass this class you must complete six blog postings and this essay. Essay's are to be turned in at 6 PM in 110 Barrows on December 7th, 2009.

For the essays I want you to make a strong argument that you will support with evidence. Your argument must be made clear in your intro paragraph. You must also support every claim you make with a reference. (For example, you can’t just say a government is repressive without having something to back you up. Do this and you will fail!) You must cite at least one reading from the blog. You may also feel free to use any outside resource you please, except wikipedia. Citation can be done in a variety of ways, as long as it is consistent. However, you must include a bibliography at the end of your essay.

A hardcopy of your essay is due at the beginning of the final class session, December 7th, 2009. E-mail copies will not be accepted! You may turn in the essay earlier if you please.

Topics:

1. Describe the system of concessions during the Qajar period in Iran. How did this impact the 1906 Constitutional Revolution?

2. Discuss how the U.S. government both benefited from, and was eventually repudiated for, the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammad Mossadegh. Be sure to include information regarding Cold War politics and how it legitimated the intervention.

3. Describe some of the events that contributed to the culmination of the Revolution of 1979. What inspired the Revolution? What components of the Shah’s program did people oppose?

4. “It was Iran against the world” is a statement that is constantly used to describe the Iran-Iraq war. To what extent is this true? Describe the support given to both Iran and Iraq during the war. Make sure to also discuss the controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.

5. Describe the powers of the Supreme Leader. How have his actions colored the presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad?

6. Should Iran be allowed to continue its nuclear program? Keep in mind Iran’s domestic needs, its stated intentions, and the possible threats the program poses.

7. With the election of Barack Hussein Obama as the 44^th President of the United States, a possible new era of Iran-U.S. relations has begun. What do you think will change, if anything? Is this good or bad? .

8. Should Iran be an Islamic Republic? Why or why not? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this form of government versus the benefits and drawbacks of other forms of government? You may suggest alternative government styles, but you must also comment on their feasibility in the Iranian context.

9. Topic of your choice. You must have this approved by me before writing your essay. Either speak to me in class or shoot me an e-mail.

Feel free to talk to me about your essays. I am always here to answer your questions. Good luck!

Foreign Policy Magazine: The Rise of the Iranian Dictatorship | Foreign Policy

2009-11-16T04:36:00.000-08:00

This article obviously has a bias against the current Iranian regime you should try and be more objective in your reading of the facts and events described. Although this article doesn't deal with Ahmedinejad directly, try to think about who the majority of his constituents were during the 2005 elections. You guys know more about the governmental structure of Iran than the people writing the article, think about the "Islamic" counterparts to the secular institutions of the Iranian government. So try to think about how Khameini's appointments to the Revolutionary Guard from the Basiji (both "Islamic" arms of the government) could possibly affect future elections, Iranian society as a whole, and the ability of more progressive arms of the regime (Rafsanjani, Khatami, and most recently Mousavi) to function.

The Rise of the Iranian Dictatorship | Foreign Policy

Ahmadinejad's biography

2009-11-16T04:19:00.000-08:00

Here is just some background information on Ahmedinejad taken from the Iranian Chamber Society. What do you think about his extensive education considering what you know about his Presidential platform?

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was born in village of Aradan near city of Garmsar, southeast of Tehran in 1956. He is the fourth son of an ironworker who had seven children. Mahmoud and his family migrated to Tehran when he was one-year-old. He went to primary and high school in Tehran and got his diploma and was admitted to the University of Science and Technology (Elm-o-Sanaat) in the field of civil engineering after he ranked 132nd in the nationwide university entrance exams in 1975. He was accepted as an MS student at the same university in 1986 and became a member of the scientific board of the Civil Engineering College of University of Science and Technology. Later on he got his doctorate in 1987 in the field of engineering and traffic transportation planning. He is married with two sons and one daughter.

Following the 1979 Islamic revolution he became a member the conservative faction of the Office for Strengthening Unity [OSU] Between Universities and Theological Seminaries. The OSU was established by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, one of Ayatollah Khomeini's key advisors, to organize Islamic students against the rapidly growing Islamic group of Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK).

With invasion of Iraq and start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Ahmadinejad rushed to the western fronts to fight against the enemy and joined the voluntary (basij) forces of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC). He served in different units of the Islamic Revolution Guards Engineering Corps.

He served as governor of Maku and Khoy cities in the northwestern West Azerbaijan province, and as an advisor to the governor general of the western province of Kurdistan for two years. While serving as the cultural advisor to then Ministry of Culture and Higher Education in 1993, he was appointed as governor general of the newly established northwestern province of Ardebil from 1993 to 1997. He was elected as the exemplary governor general for three consecutive years. But in 1997 the newly-installed Khatami administration removed Ahmadinejad from his post as Ardebil governor general. He returned to the University of Science and Technology (Elm-o-Sanaat) again to teach in 1997.

In April 2003 Ahmadinejad was appointed mayor of Tehran by the capital's municipal council, which is dominated by the hard-line Islamic Iran Developers Coalition (Etelaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami). In some of Ahmadinejad's public statements, he has appeared to identify himself as a Developer. He lives a very Spartan lifestyle and that's how he projected himself. As Mayor, he reversed many of the policies of previous moderate and reformist mayors, placing serious religious emphasis on the activities of the cultural centers by turning them into prayer halls during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. He also suggested the burial of the bodies of martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war in major city squares of Tehran.

On 24 June 2005 Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as Iran's sixth president. He swept to the presidential post with a stunning 17,046,441 votes out of a total of 27,536,069 votes cast in the runoff election.

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/mahmadinejad/mahmoud_ahmadinejad.php

BBC on Khatami

2009-11-05T22:30:00.000-08:00

The following BBC article was written two days before Khatami was elected as President for a second term. Note the support the article gives him and think about how his Presidency actually played out, remember the students at his farewell speech?

You are in: World: Middle East

-------------

From Our Own Correspondent

-------------

Wednesday, 6 June, 2001, 19:18 GMT 20:18 UK

Profile: Mohammad Khatami

Mohammad Khatami: The promise of radical change

BBC News Online profiles Iran's President Mohammad Khatami, the overwhelming favourite in the country's presidential elections on 8 June.

Mohammad Khatami arrived on the political scene in Iran with a stunning victory in the 1997 presidential elections.

Until then a little known cleric, he captured almost 70% of the vote, humiliating the conservative candidate.

This is a man who went on public buses. He's the kind of baby-kissing politician we're used to in the United States

Analyst Elaine Sciolino

Mr Khatami promised Iranians change, and women and the young came to vote for him with an enthusiasm that has not been seen in previous elections.

Unlike the dour, unsmiling ayatollahs Iranians had become accustomed to, here was an Islamic leader of a very different kind.

"He didn't just charm me, he charmed the whole country - and that's why he was elected in 1997 in that stunning victory," says Elaine Sciolino, a writer on Iran for the New York Times .

"This is a man who went on public buses. He's the kind of baby-kissing politician we're used to here in the United States. He rolled up his sleeves publicly and gave blood. He tries to straddle the world of Islam and Islamic clericalism, and the world of the people."

Iranians were struck by the new president's openness to fresh ideas.

Opposition and achievements

At the end of his first term, Mr Khatami has not been able to put his reformist programme into practice.

Khatami's discourse of civil society, democracy, transparency, rule of law, and all this - which were quite absent in the 1980s - became dominant concepts, so that even certain segments of the conservatives tried to speak a similar language

Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat

He has faced staunch opposition from the conservatives who control many of the country's main institutions, despite reformist control of the parliament.

Much of the press that backs Mr Khatami's reforms has been silenced, and many of the president's supporters have been jailed or face charges.

But there have been some notable achievements.

"First of all, there's a change in ideas, and that's very important. Khatami's discourse of civil society, democracy, transparency, rule of law, and all this - which were quite absent in the 1980s - became dominant concepts, so that even certain segments of the conservatives tried to speak a similar language," Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat argues.

Gradualist

Mr Khatami believes in gradual change, despite the pressure from his own supporters who want faster and more radical reforms.

Khatami facts

Born in 1943 in Ardakan in the province of Yazd Province

Father was a well-known cleric and friend of Ayatollah Khomeini

He is married and has three children Speaks Arabic, English and German as well as Farsi

Was cultural adviser to his predecessor Hashemi Rafsanjani and head of Iran's National Library

Though the political and social reforms he proposes for Iran are far reaching, and in some ways revolutionary, Mr Khatami has no interest in destabilising the state and wants to see change without bloodshed.

The disappointment of his reformist supporters has led many to question whether the president can deliver even gradual reform.

Announcing his candidacy, Mr Khatami described himself as a "reluctant" candidate because of his failure to deliver what he promised four years ago.

Despite all his difficulties, Mr Khatami is still expected to win by a large majority.

Most Iranians agree with their president that, sooner or later, change in Iran is inevitable despite the rearguard action of the conservatives.

taken from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1373476.stm

The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency

2009-11-05T22:25:00.001-08:00

Deciphering Iran:

The Political Evolution of the Islamic Republic and U.S. Foreign Policy After September 11

Bahram Rajaee

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration has pursued a robust and aggressive foreign policy. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have not only placed the Bush administration in conflict with longstanding U. S. allies and the majority of global public opinion, but it has also found itself in an awkward position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant regional power in Southwest Asia and nemesis of the United States following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since the Revolution, U. S.-Iranian relations have been suspicious, hostile, and at times violent. From a historical perspective, it is increasingly evident that the unseating of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the U. S.'s close ally of more than three decades, was a watershed event with ramifications that continue to affect Iran, Southwest Asia, and the United States. Today, the pursuit of U. S. interests and the quest for regional stability—in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia—leads in numerous and overlapping paths squarely back to Iran.

The Bush Doctrine is defined by an emphasis on the right of the United States to use preemptive force against terrorists and their state sponsors; it has at its core a moral worldview that starkly contrasts good versus evil, and it makes no distinction between those who carry out acts of terrorism and those who harbor terrorists.¹The consequences in U. S. foreign policy have included an aversion to nuance in favor of "moral clarity," and President Bush's message to the rest of the world that "either you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists."² In this context, it is no surprise that the Bush administration's approach to Iran has shown little appreciation for the impact of its actions upon the competition for political power in Iran today between radical and modernist Islamists—two prominent factions within the ruling clergy that disagree profoundly on the role of Islam in society.

The significance of the differences between radical and modernist Islamists is crucial due to the de facto compression of all political interaction in Iran after 1979 into the only remaining framework and discourse: Islamism, or the use of the religion of Islam as a basis for political mobilization. Political agendas and policymaking among the clerical elite in contemporary Iran are therefore shaped by factional differences rooted in Islamist ideology, which are of great relevance to U. S.-Iranian relations. The radical Islamists are widely referred to in the West as "conservatives" because of their adherence to dogmatic Islamic extremism, and they maintain a hold on the Islamic Republic's unelected but dominant centers of power. They also generally oppose normalized relations with the U. S. The modernist Islamists are widely referred to in the West as "reformists" due to their opposition to the monopoly on religious interpretation and political power claimed by the radicals. They favor greater democratization and the restoration of normal ties with the United States as part of a broader reversal of Iran's post-1979 isolation. However, the factionalization of Islamists in Iran transcends this simplified explanation. A more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Islamism in Iran—one that accounts for the roots of the radicals and modernists as well as subgroups within those factions—is warranted and will be offered in the following analysis.

Despite clear indications that the continued political viability of the modernists benefits U. S. interests directly, the Bush administration's hardline posture toward Iran since 2002 has helped to erode the ability of the modernists to argue for transparency and moderation in Iran's foreign and domestic policies. Inflammatory U. S. actions in recent years, such as the notorious "axis of evil" accusation during Bush's 2003 State of the Union address, have provided the radical Islamists with a powerful political weapon to use against their modernist rivals. By increasing its pressure on Iran to the point where all factions of the Iranian regime perceive an immediate national security threat, the Bush administration has facilitated the reversal of the fortunes of the modernists [End Page 159] and the seizing of the political initiative—and Iran's foreign policy—by the very radical Islamists it seeks to sideline.

U. S.-Iranian relations today are not unlike the proverbial elephant in the room. Most aspects of U. S. interests in Southwest Asia are affected by it, but the question has been effectively ignored by the Bush administration. Addressing the U. S.-Iranian relationship to more effectively achieve post-9/11 U. S. foreign policy goals is a process that transcends the trite framework of containing Iranian radicals or engaging Iranian reformers. Rather, it requires the development of a coherent conceptual and strategic framework by U. S. policymakers upon which to base any future interaction with Iran. For policymakers and interested observers, this implies a sustained effort to appreciate the historical importance of Iran's ongoing political evolution and its consequences for Iranian foreign policy and U. S. interests in Southwest Asia.This article will seek to shed light upon the connections between these dimensions by tracing the foundations and evolution of Iran's internal political dynamics along with the impact and outcomes of the Bush administration's policy regarding Iran since 9/11.

Islamism and the Iranian Context

Since the late 1960s, Islamism has presented a growing challenge to the legitimacy of Western models of modernization and secularization. The intellectual foundations of the most extreme aspects of the Islamist movement are based on the work of prominent Islamic scholars such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), and Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979), among others, who concluded that an Islamic social order needs to stand in direct opposition to modern secularism in order to grow and flourish. The ideological and intellectual foundation for modern radical Islamism is therefore an uncompromisingly suspicious and hostile perspective regarding the nature of the relationship between an Islamic society and the West. This common thread binds all radical Islamist groups today, including the radicals within the ruling Iranian clergy.

Islamism and the Iranian Clergy

A first step toward transcending the simplistic "conservative-reformer" explanation of Iranian politics and developing a more comprehensive understanding of Islamism in Iran is understanding the phenomenon of Islamism and different types of Islamists. Using the scholarship of William Shepard, we can distinguish between three types of Islamists, or groups that view Islam as an ideology that puts forth a political agenda and act to implement that agenda. These include traditionalist Islamists, modernist Islamists, and radical Islamists.³ Each type of Islamist also contains a range of subgroups and tendencies as well. In Iran, the radical Islamists that took power after 1979 included three such subgroups (leftists, pragmatists, and conservatives). Thus, post-revolutionary Iranian politics have been dominated by the interaction of these three subgroups of radical Islamists—one of which (the leftists) ultimately evolved to the point of abandoning radical Islamist ideology in the 1990s and adopting a modernist Islamist ideological perspective instead. This shift may appear to be a minor point, but in fact has had important implications for Iranian politics and foreign policy, and is a salient element in the regional interests of the U. S.

Unlike secular ideologies, which avoid the mixing of politics and religion, radical, modernist, and traditionalist Islamists view Islam as a guide to public life; yet they differ in the manner in which Islamist political ideology should be implemented in society. Islamists are thus deeply divided along two cleavages. These include conflicting orientations regarding modernity and "Islamic totalism." Shepard defines the former as placing a high value upon modern material technology, using modern methods of social organization and mobilization, accepting modern political institutions such as parliaments and parties, and a having positive orientation toward change and the notion of progress. He defines the latter as the tendency to view Islam as an inherently all-encompassing, total way of life with specific guidance for the political, economic and social realms.⁴ The upshot is that not all Islamists reject modernity or view Islam as a comprehensive ideology that must dominate all aspects of society. Of the three Islamist types, the radical Islamists are the most committed to the notion of Islamic totalism while simultaneously (and perhaps surprisingly) being more open to modernism and mass-based political action to achieve their goals. Radical Islamists seek to apply their interpretation ofShari'a law and Islamic principles to all aspects of social life as extensively as possible, and by all means possible—including employing violence and terrorism. Traditionalist Islamists, by contrast, are inclined to avoid modern forms and modes of political engagement and prefer to emphasize the historical role of Islam in society: mosque-based, scholarly, private and somewhat aloof from the ebb and flow of daily politics. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq is a prominent example of this school of thought today. Modernist Islamists advocate the flexible interpretation of Islamic principles in order to accommodate changes wrought by modern forms of social interaction and technology. They reject the traditionalists' avoidance of overt political involvement and as well as the radicals' goal of imposing a strict Islamist order by all means necessary. Modernists [End Page 160] view Islam as possessing a natural flexibility in the public sphere that can be used "...to interpret Islam in terms congruent with, or at least in very positive dialogue with, one or more Western ideologies."⁵

These different approaches to the role of Islam in politics and society are based on enduring distinctions, yet are often ignored or glossed over by Western analysts and observers. Nevertheless, these ideological differences largely dictate the political agendas advocated by various Islamist groups—including the modernists and radicals in Iran today. Despite the fact that the political factions within the Iranian regime have common roots in the radical Islamist movement that led the 1979 revolution, crucial ideological differences have emerged over time. The Iranian politicians viewed as "reformists" today are themselves former radical Islamists who have changed to be broadly reflective of the modernist Islamist impulse. The politicians who are viewed as "conservatives" remain unreconstructed radical Islamists. The traditionalists never adhered to radical Islamism and represent the vast majority of the Iranian clergy that have largely remained outside government since 1979; they are concerned with the loss of status for the clergy in Iran due to the politicization of a small number of their peers.

The modernist Islamist vision for the future of Iran and Islam stands as a stark alternative to radical Islamism. Modernist Islamist philosophers such as Abdolkarim Soroush in Iran pose two central points that represent breakthroughs in the world of Shi'a Islamic thought and also converge directly with U. S. interests and policies.⁶The first point is that while Islamic principles are immutable, the human interpretation of them can and should change through time. There can therefore be no monopolistic interpretation of Islam—a claim that strikes at the very core of radical Islamism. The second point is that a truly religious state is one that must be democratic, and "to be a religious man necessitates being a democratic man as well."⁷ The importance of this assertion should not be underestimated, for it represents the indigenous Islamic articulation of a political doctrine that requires democracy as a necessary feature of modern society.

It is important to note that Iran's ongoing experiment in combining theocracy and democracy since 1979 is one that is not easily replicated outside Iran. Iran is a non-Arab, Shi'a country; in a region that is otherwise overwhelmingly Sunni, more than ninety per cent of its population of sixty-eight million subscribe to this minority branch of Islam.⁸ In addition, unlike the experience of most Sunni-dominated polities, Iran's political history has been shaped by the Shi'a belief that legitimate political and religious authority can only be interpreted by qualified mojtaheds (Shi'a scholars) who are located outside the state. Shi'a believers are thus guided by a small number of Grand Ayatollahs who sit at the apex of the clerical hierarchy, the most prominent of whom is the marja-e taqlid-e motlaq (Ultimate Source of Emulation).⁹ Sunni Islam has no such hierarchy or tradition. As a result, in Iranian history the ulama (clergy) have been exceptionally active in the political arena, but, with the notable exception of the revolution, the clergy has never directly assumed power.¹⁰ Following the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, the most politicized elements of the clergy emerged at the pinnacle of power in the new Islamic Republic of Iran. The unprecedented capturing of the state was spearheaded by a very small number of clerics who believed in the radical Islamist vision of Ayatollah Khomeini—even today, it is estimated that no more than three per cent of the estimated 200,000 ulama in Iran are such "regime clerics."

Islamism and Politics in Iran After 1979

From its inception, public participation and popular will have been important sources of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Iran's post-1979 political system features the full range of modern political institutions, including a regularly elected President and Majles (Parliament).¹¹ However, based upon Khomeini's doctrine of radical Islamism, the Islamic Republic system has enshrined the notion of the velayat-e-faqih (rule of the Islamic jurisprudent) where a single cleric serves as the religious and political leader. The system features a powerful set of Islamic oversight mechanisms as well; institutions such as the Assembly of Experts, Council of Guardians and the Supreme Leadership (Rahbar-e Enqelab) were created with veto power over the representative institutions. Ayatollah Khomeini served as the Rahbar—a position combining ultimate religious and political leadership— until his death in 1989.

The Islamic Republic has faced significant internal tensions in its short history due to this hybrid religious-democratic arrangement. In spite of external threats such as the hostile relationship with the U. S., Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1980, and the war in neighboring Afghanistan, the most dangerous long-term challenge to the system's legitimacy and survival has come from within the clerical establishment itself—primarily from the internal fracturing of the ruling radical Islamists into competing factions, but from the opposition of traditionalist clerics outside government as well.

Factionalism in the Post-Khomeini Era

According to one contemporary observer of Iranian affairs,

The unchallenged authority and charisma of Ayatollah [End Page 161] Ruhollah Khomeini obscured the regime's underlying contradictions.... The divisions within the clerical community, where many traditionalist clerics had long viewed actual assumption of temporal power as inconsistent with Shiite theology, went unaired. ... The death of the founder of the Islamic Republic eroded the fragile political consensus and deprived the clerical establishment of its charismatic leader and its institutional coherence.¹²

Even prior to Khomeini's death, intense factionalism was evident among Iran's radical Islamist elite and had driven two notable events. The first was the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in 1987—formed in 1979 to serve as a unifying political organization for the radical Islamist revolutionary cadres and leadership. The second event was the extra-constitutional creation of the Expediency Council in 1988 to break the legislative gridlock that had emerged between the Majles and the Council of Guardians, which were dominated by opposing factions.¹³ The Expediency Council has since become one of the most powerful political institutions in Iran.

In the 1980s the radical Islamist elite began to fracture into pronounced leftist, pragmatist, and conservative factions as subgroups began to speak to competing constituencies, differ on policy issues, and develop conflicting perspectives on religion's role in society.¹⁴ The leftists dominated the Majles in the 1980s. They advocated statist economic policies broadly informed by a blend of Marxism and notions of social justice, fiercely opposed the restoration of ties with the U. S., and were staunch disciples of Ayatollah Khomeini's radical ideology as well as his concept of the velayat-e faqih. The conservatives favored laissez-faire economic policies and a less dogmatic and revolutionary foreign policy, but were more extreme in terms of their adherence to the application of Islam to the social and cultural realms. Their loyalty to Khomeini's system of the velayat-e faqih was less pronounced than that of the leftists, and they were more closely aligned with the traditionalist clergy that opposed the faqih system. The pragmatists formed the buffer faction; they emphasized a pro-business approach to economic reconstruction after the devastating 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the easing of social and cultural restrictions mandated by radical Islamism.

The core post-Khomeini crisis of legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is born of the fundamental contradictions between unelected theocratic rule, the historical tradition of the Iranian Shi'a clergy's opposition to the state, and constitutionally-based republicanism. The concept of the velayat-e faqih is derided and unpopular among the traditionalist clergy in Iran. Virtually all other Grand Ayatollahs—most of whom possessed religious credentials superior to those of Khomeini—publicly opposed Khomeini's doctrine after the 1979 revolution. Most were treated harshly.¹⁵

Given such opposition, Khomeini's supporters engineered a series of constitutional amendments in the months before his death. One outcome was the separation of the religious and political leadership functions so that the Rahbar no longer had to be a religious scholar of unquestionable qualifications. This change allowed for the selection of then-President Ali Khamenei as Khomeini's successor while sidestepping the vociferous protests of the traditionalist clergy. The succession was a rapid process that surprised outside observers, who largely expected a drawn-out crisis to take place. However, the pre-eminent position of religious authority in the Shi'a world, the marja-e taqlid-e motlaq, remains unoccupied. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the traditionalist Iranian-born cleric who resides in Najaf, Iraq, is the closest candidate today.¹⁶

The process of replacing Khomeini reflected a grand bargain struck between two factions of the radical Islamists—the conservatives and pragmatists—at the expense of the third faction, the leftists. While the conservatives consolidated their control over key unelected political institutions, the pragmatists (led by MajlesSpeaker Hojjatolislam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani) emerged as a popular political force. The conservative-pragmatist alliance subsequently ended the control of the leftists over the Majles by using the Council of Guardians to prevent leftist candidates from running in the 1992 parliamentary elections. The 1989-1992 period therefore marked the definitive fracturing of the radical Islamist elite in Iran. Khamenei became the new Rahbar; Rafsanjani was subsequently elected as president for two terms ending in 1997; the conservatives and pragmatists took control of the Majles; and the leftists were relegated to the political wilderness. However, according to Anoushiravan Ehteshami, the price of this bargain was high:

The process of succession ... has caused a serious rupture in the religious and political authority (and symbolism) of the spiritual leader of the Islamic state. Ultimately, as we have seen with Khomeini's successor, emphasizing the political at the expense of the religious has necessarily "de-Islamicized" the most religiously authoritative of offices in Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine.¹⁷

The resulting loss of the system's religious legitimacy was exacerbated by poor management of the economy and short-sighted social policies. The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War resulted in an estimated one million casualties and economic costs of five hundred billion to one trillion dollars. At its peak, the conflict consumed roughly two-thirds of the government's expenditures, resulting in high inflation and massive underinvestment in the [End Page 162] economy throughout the 1980s. Industries and services operated at extremely low levels of output and capacity and suffered from the lack of investment, technology, and skilled labor, as well as a bloated state bureaucracy and ineffective management.¹⁸ By 1989, Iran's economy had been stagnant for fifteen years and the cumulative effects of the war, revolution, and international isolation had dramatically eroded Iran's status as one of the world's best performing developing economies from the 1950s to 1970s. When combined with the challenges posed by Iran's growing population, these developments were immediate sources of political pressure on the radical Islamists—widely perceived to be incapable of addressing their consequences.

Modernist Islamism Emerges in Iran

Following their ejection from politics in the early 1990s, many members of the leftist faction took up positions outside government and suspended their political activities.¹⁹ As observed by Ray Takeyh,

By the early 1990s, an eclectic group of politicians, seminary leaders, religious thinkers, and intellectuals undertook an imaginative reexamination of the role of public participation in an Islamic government. An impressive array of the regime's own loyal soldiers—men who had fought for the clerical state and served in some of its highest posts—found themselves increasingly marginalized by the defenders of strict Islamic orthodoxy, and began subtly defecting from the official line.²⁰

By the mid-1990s, the left wing of the radical Islamist elite in Iran completed a remarkable metamorphosis that transformed them from radical Islamists to modernist Islamists. Influenced by the philosophy of Abdolkarim Soroush, they adopted the perspective that the influence of popular will in the governance structures of the Islamic Republic had to be strengthened to preserve the system. The leftist/modernists thus tapped into deepening public dissatisfaction by stressing the indispensability of the rights and will of the people as well as the rule of law, civil society, and pluralism.²¹

In the meantime, the conservative-pragmatist coalition was unraveling over differences on economic and cultural policy. In early 1996, supporters of President Rafsanjani formed a new political party, the Kargozaran-e Sazandegi (Executives of Construction), and continued to emphasize economic issues at the expense of radical Islamist ideology.²² In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the conservatives unexpectedly lost their majority, and fifty-three per cent of the new MPs declared their support for Rafsanjani and the pragmatists.²³ An even greater surprise occurred during the 1997 presidential elections. In February 1997 the Kargozaran threw their support behind Mohammad Khatami, a former cabinet minister in the 1980s and member of the nascent modernist faction. Khatami's platform reflected a modernist Islamist agenda, which appealed to a wide range of electoral constituencies whose political clout and dissatisfaction was growing—especially among the youth and women.²⁴

Iran's population had exploded in the 1980s due to a 3.8 per cent annual growth rate—increasing from 33.7 million in 1976 to 49.4 million in 1986—further exacerbating economic difficulties. While the growth rate has been reduced to 1.6 per cent today, by the mid-1990s the government could not create enough jobs to absorb the 700,000-800,000 young Iranians entering the job market each year.²⁵ As a result, large numbers ofyoung Iranians were emigrating to the West annually, reaching 200,000 in the late 1990s.²⁶ The sheer size of the baby boom generation, the simultaneous emergence of a robust women's rights movement, and the political demands of both groups are now enduring political realities in Iran. Recent polls show that eighty-four per cent of university students disagree with the direction of the clerical state and only five to six per cent of students watch or read religious materials.²⁷ Women currently comprise over half of all college students (as compared with twelve per cent in 1978), are involved at the highest levels of government, and have successfully pushed for the restoration of their civil rights in key areas in the 1990s.²⁸ The 1997 elections allowed women and youth to express their political preferences in a manner unprecedented in the Islamic Republic's short history, propelling the modernists and Khatami to an unanticipated landslide victory.

The election results marked the beginning of a new phase in post-Khomeini Iranian politics. Khatami received twenty million votes—or sixty-nine per cent—in a race with eighty-eight per cent voter turnout. The new Khatami administration quickly encouraged an expansion of media outlets, civic organizations, and political parties, and the modernists themselves formed a new political party, the Jebhey-e Mosharekat-e Iran-e Eslami (Islamic Iran Participation Front, or IIPF).²⁹ The IIPF then entered into a broader alliance with the Kargozaran, student, and labor groups to create the"Second of Khordad Front." However, compromises were also made between the Front and the radical Islamists—resulting in Khamenei's acceptance of Khatami's election and the modernists' decision to accept the continuing domination of the Council of Guardians and the Assembly of Experts by the radicals.³⁰ In 1999, the Khatami administration implemented a dormant clause of the constitution establishing elected municipal government; the IIPF swept those elections as well, receiving eighty per cent of the vote. Overnight, the number of elected officials in Iran increased from 400 to 200,000 and the [End Page 163] modernists eclipsed the Kargozaran as the most popular political party in Iran.

Election results aside, the radical Islamists still held sway over powerful bodies such as the Council of Guardians, Assembly of Experts, and the judiciary—including in little-known courts such as the Press Court and the Special Court for the Clergy. Through the Rahbar, they controlled an interlocking network of wealthy quasi-governmental foundations, patronage ties, and shadowy links to the security services and thuggish pressure groups such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah and Basijthat were used to intimidate and physically harass political opponents. All of these tools were employed in a concerted campaign to reassert their control, beginning with the imprisonment of two key allies of President Khatami on trumped-up charges in June and July 1998.³¹ That winter several dissident writers and secular politicians were brutally murdered, and the crimes were traced by the Iranian media to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and radical Islamist politicians.³²

Popular sentiment against radical Islamism continued to grow in Iran during the late 1990s, and the modernists gathered greater momentum in the next two major political contests. The elections for the Sixth Majles (2000-2004) were held in February 2000, and of the 6,800 candidates only eleven per cent were disqualified by the Council of Guardians. This compared with a thirty-five per cent disqualification rate in the previous Majles elections, and indicates the extent to which the radicals were unaware of their own unpopularity or the changes within their former leftist colleagues.³³ The IIPF and its allies won a dominant majority of 220 out of 290 seats, with record voter turnout of eighty-three per cent.³⁴ In 2001, President Khatami easily won reelection against weak opposition from the radical Islamists, and received seventy-seven per cent of the vote.³⁵

These additional, humiliating defeats sparked a strong response from the embattled radicals through the judiciary. Since April 2000, dozens of journalists have been imprisoned and more than one hundred pro-modernist newspapers and magazines have been closed down by the Press Court.³⁶ IIPF MPs have been personally targeted as well, despite the parliamentary immunity provided them in the constitution. During the winter of 2001, three MPs were imprisoned or convicted on charges of criticizing or defaming the courts and in February 2002 sixty others were summoned to answer charges of "corruption." In addition to this campaign of harassment and intimidation, the radicals have effectively employed their domination of the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council to thwart pending modernist legislation on reforms to the Press Law, fiscal policy, the constitution, gender and civil rights, and the penal code.

By 2004, the inability of the modernists to act on their electoral mandates in the face of resolute opposition by the radicals had a pronounced political effect, with public support for the modernists declining noticeably from its peak.³⁷ Sensing this trend, and feeling increasingly insecure due to a combination of their own domestic unpopularity and the Bush administration's growing belligerence, the radicals escalated their efforts to further roll back the modernist gains. During the February 2004 elections for the Seventh Majles (2004-2008) over 2,500 out of 7,700 candidates (mostly from the IIPF) were deemed unfit to stand as candidates by the Council of Guardians. This was four times the number disqualified in the 2000 elections, and remarkably included eighty sitting modernist MPs. The IIPF reacted vehemently but ultimately ineffectively, and the Khatami administration had little choice but to carry out the elections. Not having done so would likely have spurred the radicals to declare a state of emergency, under the guise of national security imperatives, and use the armed forces to seize control of the government—precipitating an unprecedented constitutional and political crisis.

Given the Bush administration's escalation of pressure on Iran in 2002-2003, such a scenario was viewed by the radicals and members of all factions (including the modernists) who wanted the post-1979 regime to continue, as a direct threat to the regime's survival. As a result, despite vociferous domestic and international criticism, the radicals' determination to see the flawed election through remained firm. The final election results confirmed expectations: the radicals controlled 190 seats in the new Majles and the modernists fifty seats, with the remainder forming a swing bloc of unaffiliated MPs.³⁸ Voter turnout was a record low fifty-one per cent, down from eighty-three per cent four years earlier.³⁹

It is likely that the radicals will seek to determine the outcome of the 2005 presidential election in the same manner. However, fundamental social changes in Iran—rooted in the continuing demographic boom (the population is expected to surpass eighty million by 2015) and the public's demands for greater democratization and less radical Islamism in government—are gradually but inexorably shifting the political ground. These changes have affected the frame of reference employed by the radicals themselves, elements of which have responded to their string of resounding electoral defeats in the 1990s by advocating the revamping of their rigid Islamist ideology in order to avoid eventual political oblivion.⁴⁰ For example, the Speaker of the new Seventh Majles will be a non-cleric—a first since [End Page 164] 1979—and was nominated by the radicals. In this sense, the demands of the public and emergence of the modernist movement have forced a paradigm shift in Iranian politics.

The Foreign Policy Impact of the Modernists

From 1997—2004 the modernists were the dominant political faction in Iran due to their willingness to voice the demands of Iranian voters for a less restrictive social and political environment, improved economic opportunity, greater integration with the outside world, and the normalization of Iran's international relations. The realm of foreign policy is one where the contrast between the two factions—i.e., the "Dialogue Among Civilizations" as advanced by President Khatami versus the fierce opposition of the radical Islamists to improved relations with the U. S., or "Great Satan"—could not be starker. In a recent review of Iranian factional politics, Hossein Seifzadeh characterizes the modernist approach to foreign policy in this manner:

Reformists also view foreign policy as a means of reducing pressures on Iran and the Islamic regime within.... It is hoped that through détente, reducing tensions and conflicts, dialogue among civilizations, coalitions for peace, and political deterrence, it is possible for Iran to increase access to international resources, investments, and markets... [the] reformist doctrine of foreign policy emphasizes the enhancement of human dignity, welfare, and global interdependence.⁴¹

President Khatami's foreign policy thus rejects the notion of the clash of civilizations, believes in the interdependence of societies, advocates a proactive approach, and has yielded significant successes.⁴² Relations have improved with all major European states since 1997, and Iran has helped to create a more harmonious regional environment by significantly improving its ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and other Arab states.

Notable progress was made in U. S.-Iranian relations as well. In January 1998 President Khatami gave an unprecedented interview on CNN in which he expressed regret for the 1979 U. S. embassy seizure and hostage crisis and called for a "crack in the wall of mistrust" between the two governments.⁴³ Secretary of State Albright reciprocated in a June 1998 speech, stating a U. S. willingness to seek a genuine reconciliation with Iran and remove the mutual hostility that the Clinton administration viewed as "not insurmountable."⁴⁴ These comments initiated the increased exchange of athletes and academics, a marked lowering of hostile rhetoric, and the eventual lifting of some trade sanctions on Iran by the United States in 2000. The radical Islamists and Khamenei have continually vetoed the normalization of relations with the U. S. since 1997, but in doing so were once again out of step with most Iranians. A 2002 poll of Tehran residents showed that seventy-four per cent favored talks with the United States, and seventy-nine per cent supported a dialogue even in the absence of formal relations.⁴⁵ However, the Bush administration has evinced little interest in continuing a comprehensive dialogue with Iran and has instead exerted strong unilateral pressure after 9/11—thus directly undermining the modernist's argument that normal relations with the U. S. would not harm Iran's interests.

-Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24.1 (2004) 159-172

found on http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v024/24.1rajaee.html

Hot Tea and Cool Conversations in Iran

2009-10-19T20:09:00.000-07:00

For those of you that were there during the documentary, you can write a blog response in lieu of one of the articles.

Address some of the following questions:

Was there a particular moment that stuck out? Why? What was your reaction to Iran and the way people treated Brenden especially considering he did not speak Farsi? How effective do you think this documentary was at being a model of "citizen diplomacy" and was it successful at portraying contemporary Iran in a different light?

These are not mandatory questions but are made to help direct your blog response.

The synopsis and his director's statement are below as well as a link to the movie site.



*Iran: Hot Tea, Cool Conversations--*a revealing documentary that chronicles an American college student's eye-opening journey to Iran. A testament to Citizen Diplomacy, the film highlights unscripted, touching interviews with a number of individuals the filmmaker encounters from all walks of life during this once in a lifetime adventure. The human scale of the film cuts through the political rhetoric of the day unveiling a country full of warm and compassionate people who desire peace and friendship with America and the West.


Director's Statement:

When official diplomacy fails, Citizen Diplomacy is our only hope.

So long I had sat at the television, watching and listening to biased news coverage aimed at isolating Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil.” This portrayal of Iran was difficult for me to believe. The media's antagonism inspired me to set out on a journey that's scope was far greater than I could have ever imagined. That once-in-a-lifetime trip blossomed into Iran: Hot Tea, Cool Conversations.

Here at home, I interviewed many Americans who associated Iran with “War,” “Violence,” and the 1979 “Hostage Crisis.” But I felt there had to be more to the story. I had to see Iran for myself. Little did I know that my journey would be one, not of just travel, but self-discovery.

My journey began with a simple desire to travel off the beaten path and see Iran through my own eyes. The true impact made on me by the Iranian people came not as much during the shooting of the film in Iran , but back at home while putting it all together. Like a hermit on my computer, night, after night, I entered the timeless world of editing. It was not until then, with hours of video to be sorted, that I realized the full effect of this journey. I feel a responsibility to share an honest glimpse into this mystical place with my fellow Americans. This is more than a movie; it is a dedication to citizen diplomacy and citizen diplomats everywhere.

This documentary reflects a lyrical telling of my time in Iran as an American interwoven with my personal journey as a renegade filmmaker. Iran: Hot Tea, Cool Conversations challenges the conventional media portrayal of Iran , a nation steeped in a deep sense of culture and humanity. Beyond all the noise and propaganda designed to separate us from one another, citizen diplomacy brings out the global citizen in all of us. "

--Brenden Hamilton

-----http://www.iranthemovie.com/about.html

Iran's Governmental Structure

2009-10-19T20:04:00.001-07:00

This is the slide from class explaining how each different political institution functions with each other. As you can see the assembly of experts is in charge of choosing the next supreme leader. The Supreme leader carries the most power and reviews all decisions of the political offices below him meaning the armed forces, the judiciary branch and the expendiency council, a mediating body between majlis and the guardian council, as well as the guardian council. The supreme leader also reviews the actions of the president.

Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War

2009-10-19T12:55:00.000-07:00

http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/81ali.pdf

This is a case study on the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. It addresses the issues of who and where the support came from as well as the world's response and how Iran was able to deal with the attacks.

Iran: Revolution from the Throne

2009-09-28T15:56:00.000-07:00

Iran: Revolution from the Throne

This time magazine article talks about the different factors that led up to the 1979 revolution and why these things were significant.

An Account of the 1953 Coup.

2009-09-28T15:52:00.000-07:00

A short account of 1953 Coup
Operation code-name: TP-AJAX

Pages: 1 2 3 Page 1

Coup 53 of Iran is the CIA's (Central Intelligence Agency) first successful overthrow of a foreign government.

But a copy of the agency's secret history of the coup has surfaced, revealing the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979, and for a generation of anti-American hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries. The document, which remains classified, discloses the pivotal role British intelligence officials played in initiating and planning the coup, and it shows that Washington and London shared an interest in maintaining the West's control over Iranian oil.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber,
a CIA spy, with the cover of
Persian architectural expert,
who planned the coup in Iran.

The secret history, written by the CIA's chief coup planner, says the operation's success was mostly a matter of chance. The document shows that the agency had almost complete contempt for the man it was empowering, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. And it recounts, for the first time, the agency's badly tried to seduce and force the shah into taking part in his own coup.

The operation, code-named TP-AJAX, was the blueprint for a succession of CIA plots to foment coups and destabilize governments during the cold war - including the agency's successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the disastrous Cuban intervention known as the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In more than one instance, such operations led to the same kind of long-term animosity toward the United States that occurred in Iran.

The history says agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement, sent a stream of envoys to bolster the shah's courage, directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party, and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers.

But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, CIA officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government.

Two days after the coup, the history discloses, agency officials funneled $5 million to Iran to help the government they had installed consolidate power.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber, an expert in Persian architecture, who as one of the leading planners believed that covert operatives had much to learn from history, wrote the secret history, along with operational assessments in March 1954.

In less expansive memoirs published in 1986, Dr. Wilber asserted that the Iran coup was different from later CIA efforts. Its American planners, he said, had stirred up considerable unrest in Iran, giving Iranians a clear choice between instability and supporting the shah. The move to oust the prime minister, he wrote, thus gained substantial popular support.

Dr. Wilber's memoirs were heavily censored by the agency, but he was allowed to refer to the existence of his secret history. "If this history had been read by the planners of the Bay of Pigs," he wrote, "there would have been no such operation."

"From time to time," he continued, "I gave talks on the operation to various groups within the agency, and, in hindsight, one might wonder why no one from the Cuban desk ever came or read the history."

The coup was a turning point in modern Iranian history and remains a persistent irritant in Tehran-Washington relations. It consolidated the power of the shah, who ruled with an iron hand for 26 more years in close contact with the United States. He was toppled by Iranian Revolution of 1979. Later that year, "Students of Imam Line" went to the American Embassy, took diplomats hostage and declared that they had unmasked a "nest of spies" who had been manipulating Iran for decades.

The Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini supported terrorist attacks against American interests largely because of the long American history of supporting the shah's suppressive regime. Even under more moderate rulers, many Iranians still resent the United States' role in the coup and its support of the shah.

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in an address, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before.

"The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons," she said. "But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."

The history spells out the calculations to which Dr. Albright referred in her speech. Britain, it says, initiated the plot in 1952. The Truman administration rejected it, but President Eisenhower approved it shortly after taking office in 1953, because of fears about oil and Communism.

The document pulls few punches, acknowledging at one point that the agency baldly lied to its British allies. Dr. Wilber reserves his most withering asides for the agency's local allies, referring to "the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner."

Shah with General Fazlollah Zahdei (right), spearhead
of CIA planned coup of 1953 in favour of Shah

Britain Fights Oil Nationalism
The coup had its roots in a British showdown with Iran, restive under decades of near-colonial British domination.

The prize was Iran's oil fields. Britain occupied Iran in World War II to protect a supply route to its ally, the Soviet Union, and to prevent the oil from falling into the hands of the Nazis - ousting the shah's father, whom it regarded as unmanageable. It retained control over Iran's oil after the war through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

In 1951, Iran's Parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, and legislators backing the law elected its leading advocate, Dr. Mosaddeq, as prime minister. Britain responded with threats and sanctions.

Dr. Mosaddeq, a European-educated lawyer then in his early 70's, prone to tears and outbursts, refused to back down. In meetings in November and December 1952, the secret history says, British intelligence officials startled their American counterparts with a plan for a joint operation to oust the nettlesome prime minister.

The Americans, who "had not intended to discuss this question at all," agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there.

In March 1953, an unexpected development pushed the plot forward: the CIA's Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had approached the American Embassy about supporting an army-led coup.

The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration was intrigued. The coalition that elected Dr. Mosaddeq was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active.

Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, approved $1 million on April 4 to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddeq," the history says.

"The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party."

Within days agency officials identified a high-ranking officer, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, as the man to spearhead a coup. Their plan called for the shah to play a leading role.

"A shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mosaddeq," officials wrote, "particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mosaddeq's orders."

But according to the history, planners had doubts about whether the shah could carry out such a bold operation.

His family had seized Iran's throne just 32 years earlier, when his powerful father led a coup of his own. But the young shah, agency officials wrote, was "by nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears," often at odds with his family, including Princess Ashraf, his "forceful and scheming twin sister."

Also, the shah had what the CIA termed a "pathological fear" of British intrigues, a potential obstacle to a joint operation.

In May 1953 the agency sent Dr. Wilber to Cyprus to meet Norman Darbyshire, chief of the Iran branch of British intelligence, to make initial coup plans. Assuaging the fears of the shah was high on their agenda; a document from the meeting said he was to be persuaded that the United States and Britain "consider the oil question secondary."

The conversation at the meeting turned to a touchy subject, the identity of key agents inside Iran. The British said they had recruited two brothers named Rashidian. The Americans, the secret history discloses, did not trust the British and lied about the identity of their best "assets" inside Iran.

CIA officials were divided over whether the plan drawn up in Cyprus could work. The Tehran station warned headquarters that the "the shah would not act decisively against Mosaddeq." And it said General Zahedi, the man picked to lead the coup, "appeared lacking in drive, energy and concrete plans."

Despite the doubts, the agency's Tehran station began disseminating "gray propaganda," passing out anti-Mosaddeq cartoons in the streets and planting unflattering articles in the local press.
First Few Days Look Disastrous
The coup began on the night of Aug. 15 and was immediately compromised by a talkative Iranian Army officer whose remarks were relayed to Mr. Mosaddeq.

The operation, the secret history says, "still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture."

Dr. Mosaddeq's chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi, learned of the plot hours before it was to begin and sent his deputy to the barracks of the Imperial Guard.

The deputy was arrested there, according to the history, just as pro-shah soldiers were fanning out across the city arresting other senior officials. Telephone lines between army and government offices were cut, and the telephone exchange was occupied.

But phones inexplicably continued to function, which gave Dr. Mosaddeq's forces a key advantage. General Riahi also eluded the pro-shah units, rallying commanders to the prime minister's side.

Pro-shah soldiers sent to arrest Dr. Mosaddeq at his home were instead captured. The top military officer working with General Zahedi fled when he saw tanks and loyal government soldiers at army headquarters.

The next morning, the history states, the Tehran radio announced that a coup against the government had failed, and Dr. Mosaddeq scrambled to strengthen his hold on the army and key installations. CIA officers inside the embassy were flying blind; the history says they had "no way of knowing what was happening."

Mr. Roosevelt left the embassy and tracked down General Zahedi, who was in hiding north of Tehran. Surprisingly, the general was not ready to abandon the operation. The coup, the two men agreed, could still work, provided they could persuade the public that General Zahedi was the lawful prime minister.

To accomplish this, the history discloses, the coup plotters had to get out the news that the shah had signed the two decrees.

The CIA station in Tehran sent a message to The Associated Press in New York, asserting that "unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the shah, one dismissing Mosaddeq and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him."

The CIA and its agents also arranged for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers, the history says.

The propaganda initiative quickly bogged down. Many of the CIA's Iranian agents were under arrest or on the run. That afternoon, agency operatives prepared a statement from General Zahedi that they hoped to distribute publicly. But they could not find a printing press that was not being watched by forces loyal to the prime minister.

On Aug. 16, prospects of reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly a fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had bolted to Baghdad. CIA headquarters cabled Tehran urging Mr. Roosevelt, the station chief, to leave immediately.

He did not agree, insisting that there was still "a slight remaining chance of success," if the shah would broadcast an address on the Baghdad radio and General Zahedi took an aggressive stand.

The first sign that the tide might turn came with reports that Iranian soldiers had broken up Tudeh, or Communist, groups, beating them and making them chant their support for the shah. "The station continued to feel that the project was not quite dead," the secret history recounts.

Meanwhile, Dr. Mosaddeq had overreached, playing into the CIA's hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup.

On the morning of Aug. 17 the shah finally announced from Baghdad that he had signed the decrees - though he had by now delayed so long that plotters feared it was too late. At this critical point Dr. Mosaddeq let down his guard. Lulled by the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers involved in the coup, the government recalled most troops it had stationed around the city, believing that the danger had passed.

The Shah and Queen Soraya arrived in Rome on Aug. 18, 1953

That night the CIA arranged for General Zahedi and other key Iranian agents and army officers to be smuggled into the embassy compound "in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps" for a "council of war."

They agreed to start a counterattack on Aug. 19, sending a leading cleric from Tehran to the holy city of Qom to try to orchestrate a call for a holy war against Communism. (The religious forces they were trying to manipulate would years later call the United States "the Great Satan.")

Using travel papers forged by the CIA, key army officers went to outlying army garrisons to persuade commanders to join the coup.

Once again, the shah disappointed the CIA He left Baghdad for Rome the next day, apparently an exile. Newspapers supporting Dr. Mosaddeq reported that the Pahlavi dynasty had come to an end, and a statement from the Communist Party's central committee attributed the coup attempt to "Anglo-American intrigue." Demonstrators ripped down imperial statues -- as they would again 26 years later during the Islamic revolution.

The CIA station cabled headquarters for advice on whether to "continue with TP-AJAX or withdraw." "Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair," the history states, adding, "The message sent to Tehran on the night of Aug. 18 said that 'the operation has been tried and failed,' and that 'in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary operations against Mosaddeq should be discontinued'."

CIA and Moscow Are Both Surprised

Royalists, carrying a picture of the shah,
rode a commandeered bus in Tehran on Aug. 19, 1953,
when the coup became a success.

But just as the Americans were ready to quit, the mood on the streets of Tehran shifted. On the morning of Aug. 19, several Tehran papers published the shah's long-awaited decrees, and soon pro-shah crowds were building in the streets.

"They needed only leadership," the secret history says. And Iranian agents of the CIA provided it. Without specific orders, a journalist who was one of the agency's most important Iranian agents led a crowd toward Parliament, inciting people to set fire to the offices of a newspaper owned by Dr. Mosaddeq's foreign minister. Another Iranian CIA agent led a crowd to sack the offices of pro-Tudeh papers.

"The news that something quite startling was happening spread at great speed throughout the city," the history states.

The CIA tried to exploit the situation, sending urgent messages that the Rashidian brothers and two key American agents should "swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators."

But things were now moving far too quickly for the agency to manage. An Iranian Army colonel who had been involved in the plot several days earlier suddenly appeared outside Parliament with a tank, while members of the now-disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. "By 10:15 there were pro-shah truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares," the secret history says.

By noon the crowds began to receive direct leadership from a few officers involved in the plot and some who had switched sides. Within an hour the central telegraph office fell, and telegrams were sent to the provinces urging a pro-shah uprising. After a brief shootout, police headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell as well.

The Tehran radio remained the biggest prize. With the government's fate uncertain, it was broadcasting a program on cotton prices. But by early afternoon a mass of civilians, army officers and policemen overwhelmed it. Pro-shah speakers went on the air, broadcasting the coup's success and reading the royal decrees.

At the embassy, CIA officers were elated, and Mr. Roosevelt got General Zahedi out of hiding. An army officer found a tank and drove him to the radio station, where he spoke to the nation.

Dr. Mosaddeq and other government officials were rounded up, while officers supporting General Zahedi placed "known supporters of TP-AJAX" in command of all units of the Tehran garrison.

The Soviet Union was caught completely off-guard. Even as the Mosaddeq government was falling, the Moscow radio was broadcasting a story on "the failure of the American adventure in Iran."

But CIA headquarters was as surprised as Moscow. When news of the coup's success arrived, it "seemed to be a bad joke, in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before," the history says.

Throughout the day, Washington got most of its information from news agencies, receiving only two cablegrams from the station. Mr. Roosevelt later explained that if he had told headquarters what was going on, "London and Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately," the history states.

Still, the CIA took full credit inside the government. The following year it overthrew the government of Guatemala, and a myth developed that the agency could topple governments anywhere in the world.

Iran proved that third world king making could be heady. "It was a day that should never have ended," the CIA's secret history said, describing Aug. 19, 1953. "For it carried with it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether any other can come up to it."

Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq

Mohammad Mosaddeq, an eccentric nationalist
Except for Reza Shah Pahlavi founder of modern Iran and Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, father of its revolution, no leader has left a deeper mark on Iran's 20th century landscape than Mohammad Mosaddeq. And no 20th century event has fuelled Iran's suspicion of the United States as his overthrow has.

An eccentric European-educated lawyer whose father was a bureaucrat and whose mother descended from Persian kings, Dr. Mosaddeq served as a minister and governor before he opposed Reza Shah's accession in the 1920's.

He was imprisoned and then put under house arrest at his estate in the walled village of Ahmadabad west of Tehran. Eventually he bought the village, growing crops, founding an elementary school and beginning a public health project.

When Britain and Russia forced Reza Shah from power in favour of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in 1941, Dr. Mosaddeq became a member of Parliament. He was hailed as a hero for his fiery speeches on the evils of British control of Iran's oil industry. In 1951, when Parliament voted to nationalize the industry, the young shah, recognizing the nationalists' popularity, appointed Dr. Mosaddeq prime minister.

In that job he became a prisoner of his own nationalism, unable to reach an oil compromise. Even as the British negotiated with Iran, they won the support of the major oil companies in imposing an effective global boycott on Iranian oil.

Still, in the developing world Dr. Mosaddeq became an icon of anti-imperialism. He was revered despite his odd mannerisms, which included conducting business in bed in grey woollen pyjamas, weeping publicly and complaining perpetually of poor health.

He amassed power. When the shah refused his demand for control of the armed forces in 1952, Dr. Mosaddeq resigned, only to be reinstated in the face of popular riots.

He then displayed a streak of authoritarianism, bypassing Parliament by conducting a national referendum to win approval for its dissolution. Meanwhile, the United States became alarmed at the strength of Iran's Communist Party, which supported Dr. Mosaddeq.

In August 1953, a dismissal attempt by the shah sent Dr. Mosaddeq's followers into the streets. The shah fled, amid fears in the new Eisenhower administration that Iran might move too close to Moscow.

Yet Dr. Mosaddeq did not promote the interests of the Communists, though he drew on their support. Paradoxically, the party turned from him in the end because it viewed him as insufficiently committed and too close to the United States. By the time the royalist coup overthrew him after a few chaotic days, he had alienated many landowners, clerics and merchants.

Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, the ousted
prime minister, entering court for his trial.

After a trial, he served three years in prison and ended up under house arrest at his estate. In March 1967, in his mid-80's and weakened by radium treatments for throat cancer, he died.

When the revolution brought the clerics to power in 1979, anti-shah nationalists tried to revive Dr. Mosaddeq's memory. A Tehran thoroughfare called Pahlavi Avenue was renamed Mosaddeq Avenue.

But Ayatollah Khomeini saw him as a promoter not of Islam but of Persian nationalism, and envied his popularity. So Mosaddeq Avenue became Vali Asr, after the revered Hidden Imam, whose reappearance someday, Shiite Muslims believe, will establish the perfect Islamic political community. Still, even Ayatollah Khomeini was careful not to go too far. Ignoring Dr. Mosaddeq, rather than excoriating him, became the rule.

Two decades later, the Mosaddeq cult has been revitalized by resurgent nationalism and frustration with the strictures of Islam. Dr. Mosaddeq inspires the young, who long for heroes and have not necessarily found them, either in clerics or kings.

In campaigns for local elections in February 1999 and parliamentary elections a year later, reformist advertising made use of Dr. Mosaddeq's sad, elongated face. And every year since his death, his supporters have rallied at his estate.

His legacy still stirs considerable debate. In August, Parliament approved a bill to abolish a holiday marking the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. The decision set off protests in the press "Alas! Parliament ignored the most apparent symbol of the struggle of the Iranian people throughout history against colonialism," the reformist daily Khordad said. In November, legislators were forced to reinstate the holiday.

CIA Tried, With Little Success, to Use U.S. Press in Coup
Central Intelligence Agency officials plotting the 1953 coup in Iran hoped to plant articles in American newspapers saying Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's return resulted from a home-grown revolt against a Communist-leaning government, internal agency documents show.

Those hopes were largely disappointed. The CIA's history of the coup shows that its operatives had only limited success in manipulating American reporters and that none of the Americans covering the coup worked for the agency.

An analysis of the press coverage shows that American journalists filed straightforward, factual dispatches that prominently mentioned the role of Iran's Communists in street violence leading up to the coup. Western correspondents in Iran and Washington never reported that some of the unrest had been stage-managed by CIA agents posing as Communists. And they gave little emphasis to accurate contemporaneous reports in Iranian newspapers and on the Moscow radio asserting that Western powers were secretly arranging the shah's return to power.

It was just eight years after the end of World War II, which left American journalists with a sense of national interest framed by six years of confrontation between the Allies and the Axis. The front pages of Western newspapers were dominated by articles about the new global confrontation with the Soviet Union, about Moscow's prowess in developing nuclear weapons and about Congressional allegations of "Red" influence in Washington.

In one instance, the history indicates, the CIA was apparently able to use contacts at The Associated Press to put on the news wire a statement from Tehran about royal decrees that the CIA itself had written. But mostly, the agency relied on less direct means to exploit the media.

The Iran desk of the State Department, the document says, was able to place a CIA study in Newsweek, "using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist." The article was one of several planted press reports that, when reprinted in Tehran, fed the "war of nerves" against Iran's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq.

The history says the Iran operation exposed the agency's shortcomings in manipulating the American press. The CIA "lacked contacts capable of placing material so that the American publisher was unwitting as to its source."

The history discloses that a CIA officer, working under cover as the embassy's press officer, drove two American reporters to a house outside Tehran where they were shown the shah's decrees dismissing the prime minister.

Kennett Love, the New York Times reporter in Tehran during the coup, wrote about the royal decrees in the newspaper the next day, without mentioning how he had seen them. In an interview, he said he had agreed to the embassy official's ground rules that he should not report the American role in arranging the trip.

Mr. Love said he did not know at the time that the official worked for the CIA. After the coup succeeded, Mr. Love did in one article briefly refer to Iranian press reports of American involvement, and The New York Times also published an article from Moscow reporting Soviet charges that the United States was behind the coup. But neither The Times nor other American news organizations appear to have examined such charges seriously.

In a 1960 paper he wrote while studying at Princeton University, Mr. Love explained that he "was responsible, in an impromptu sort of way, for speeding the final victory of the royalists."

Seeing a half-dozen tanks parked in front of Tehran's radio station, he said, "I told the tank commanders that a lot of people were getting killed trying to storm Dr. Mosaddeq's house and that they would be of some use instead of sitting idle at the radio station." He added, "They took their machines in a body to Kakh Avenue and put the three tanks at Dr. Mosaddeq's house out of action."

Mr. Love, who left The New York Times in 1962, said in an interview that he had urged the tanks into action "because I wanted to stop the bloodshed."

Months afterward, Mr. Love says, he was told by Robert C. Doty, then Cairo bureau chief and his boss, of evidence of American involvement in the coup.

But Mr. Doty, who died in 1974, did not write about the matter, and by the summer of 1954, Mr. Love decided to tell the New York office what he knew. In a July 26, 1954, letter to Emanuel R. Freedman, then the foreign editor, Mr. Love wrote, "The only instance since I joined The Times in which I have allowed policy to influence a strict news approach was in failing to report the role our own agents played in the overthrow of Mosaddeq."

Mr. Love said he had hoped that the foreign editor would order him to pursue the subject. But he never received any response, he said.

"I wanted to let Freedman know that I knew there had been U.S. involvement in the coup, but that I hadn't written about it," he said. "I expected him to say, 'Jump on that story.' But there was no response." Mr. Freedman died in 1971.

'Gentleman Spy'
Donald Wilber, who planned the coup in Iran and wrote its secret history, was old-school CIA, a Princetonian and a Middle East architecture expert who fit neatly into the mold of the "gentleman spy."

Years of wandering through Middle Eastern architectural sites gave him the perfect cover for a clandestine life. By 1953, he was an obvious choice as the operation's strategist.

The coup was the high point of his life as a spy. Although he would excel in academia, at the agency being part-time was a handicap. "I never requested promotion, and was given only one, after the conclusion of AJAX," Dr. Wilber wrote of the Iran operation.

On his last day, "I was ushered down to the lobby by a young secretary, turned over my badge to her and left." He added, "This treatment rankled for some time. I did deserve the paperweight."

Donald Wilber died in 1997 at 89.

taken from Iran Chamber Society
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p3.php

The Qajars, The Shah, and the Constitutional Revolution

2009-09-13T21:56:00.000-07:00

Constitutional Revolution

During the early 1900s the only way to save country from government corruption and foreign manipulation was to make a written code of laws. This sentiment caused the Constitutional Revolution. There had been a series of ongoing covert and overt activities against Naser o-Din Shah’s despotic rule, for which many had lost their lives. The efforts of freedom fighters finally bore fruit during the reign of Moazaferedin Shah. Mozafaredin shah ascended to throne on June 1896. In the wake of the relentless efforts of freedom fighters, Mozafar o-Din Shah of Qajar dynasty was forced to issue the decree for the constitution and the creation of an elected parliament (the Majlis) in August 5, 1906. The royal power limited and a parliamentary system established.

Bakhtiari Revolutionaries in camp outside Esfahan (June 1909)
In front, in a white coat with a sword, is Mohammad Ebrahim Khan, Zabet of Julfa.

On August 18, 1906, the first Legislative assembly (called as Supreme National Assembly), was formed in the Military Academy to make the preparations for the opening of the first Term of the National Consultative Assembly and drafting the election law thereof. During this meeting, Prime Minister Moshirul Doleh delivered a speech as the head of the cabinet. The session concluded with the address made by Malek Al Motokalemin.

On October 7th, 1906 in a speech made in spite of his poor health, Mozaferedin Shah inaugurated the first session of the National Consultative Assembly. At this time the session was formed in the absence of representatives from provinces.

Following Mozafaredin Shah’s death, his successor, Mohammad Ali Mirza who was then ruled Tabriz as a crown prince, ascended to the throne on January 21st, 1907. Before taking the reign, he pledged to respect the fundaments of Constitution and Nation’s Rights. But he contravened this from the very beginning which made Constitutionalists to react.

Capitalizing on the internal struggles, both Russia and Britain entered a pact to settle their own differences; effectively dividing Iran into two areas of influence for their respected countries. This made headlines in early September 1907 and united the various factions in Iran. The Iranian government was officially notified of this pact on September 7, 1907 by Russian and British Ambassadors.

The rising tides of dissatisfaction and discontent caused Mohammad Mirza to summon the cabinet members on December 17, 1907 under the false pretense of soliciting advice. He immediately orders their detention. Only Nasserul Molk, who was the prime minister, was let free.

On December 22, 1907 a new cabinet was formed headed by Nezamul Saltaneh Mafi. On the surface the air is cleared and the tensions are eased. But on February 1908, a bomb is thrown at Shah’s Coach, making him highly suspicious. On June 1st, 1908 Shah purges some of the courtiers. Ambassador Zapolski of Russia and Ambassador Marling of Britain warn the Iranian Government to submit to Shah’s intents.

Freedom Fighters of Tabriz
The two men in the center are Sattar Khan & Bagher Khan.

Two days later, Shah invites the leaders of the constitutional movement to the Imperial Gardens outside Tehran. There he imprisons all save for one who manages to escape. On June 24, 1908, Shah places Majlis under siege and orders its bombardment by artillery fire.

During these times, the Tabriz uprising culminated and within the span of four months spread to Rasht, Qazvin, Esfahan, Lar, Shiraz, Hamadan,Mashhad, Astar-Abad, Bandar Abbas andBushehr. The Freedom fighters prevailed against the tyranny at all points. Yet Tabriz was still under economic and military blocked set up by government forces.

On February 17, 1909, Freedom Forces captured Rasht. By March, they succeed in taking control of Rasht and Qazvin main roads. By April 22nd, 1909, Tabriz Freedom Fighters under the leadership of Sattar Khan(Sardar-e Meli) made their attack to break through the blockade. They lost huge number of their fighters. An English Reporter named Moore and an American Missionary called Howard Baskerville, who were sympathetic with the freedom fighters were killed.

Commanded by General Yeprim and Brigadier Mohi, freedom fighters of Rasht occupied Qazvin and advanced towards Tehran.

On June 22, 1909, Bakhtiari Chieftains, led by Samsam-ul-Saltaneh and Haj Aligholi Khan Bakhtiari (Sardar As’ad) reached the city of Qum, which they took over on July 8th,1909. The intimidations and interventions made by Russian and British embassies failed to stop the advance of freedom fighters. Inevitably, a number of Russian troops were dispatched to Gilan via Badkobeh, reaching Qazvin on July 12th, 1909. Russians warned Gilan Fighters to stop moving in against Tehran.

A nationalist council at Rasht

Ignoring the warning, Gilan freedom fighters advanced towards Tehran, and met up with Bakhtiari forces near Karaj (60km west of Tehran). Using the element of surprise, these forces moved through the lines of the government forces. Thus the 3000 strong, well-equipped forces led by Mohammad Valikhan Tonekaboni and Sardar As’ad, entered the capital amid welcoming cheers of freedom loving sympathizers. Following bloody fights in the streets and the Bazaar District, once again the national forces triumphed and the Cossack brigade, having retreated to the parade grounds, was surrounded and forced into surrender.

On July 16, 1909, the capital was under complete control of freedom fighters. At 8:30, on the morning of July 17, 1909, Mohammad shah and a number of his supporters, under armed escort of Russian soldiers, took asylum with Russian Embassy in Zargandeh.

On this very day, the National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) held an emergency session and deposed Mohammad Ali Shah as a monarch, and named his 13 year old son, Ahmad Mirza as his successor. Azadulmolk was named as the Vice-Regent.

On September 10th, 1909, Mohammad Ali Shah left the Russian Embassy and went into exile in Russia.

First Term (October 7th, 1906 – June 23rd, 1908)
The most important task undertaken by the first Majlis was drafting and ratification of the Constitution on December 30th, 1906. It also set out the internal procedures. On October 17th, 1907 it drafted and ratified the constitutional amendments.

The first Majlis was dissolved before the end of its Term due to Mohammad Ali Shah’s opposition against the Constitutionalists as well as foreign intrigues. Colonel Liakhov, the Russian commander of the Iranian Cossack brigade, along with several Russian officers set artillery fire against Majlis. A number of Majlis Representatives and Constitutionalists were detained in Bagh Shah, of which a number were killed. Some fled to and sought asylum with foreign embassies. Thus the First Majlis was dissolved and a martial law was declared.

Second Term (November 15th, 1909 – December 24th, 1911)
The second Majlis came into session after a period of Interregnum that lasted almost 17 months. A two-stage, indirect plebiscite was carried out. Confronted with severe crises and dilemmas arising from interventions by foreign forces and domestic hardships, Majlis stood its ground as far as possible. Finally it was dissolved under foreign pressure. The representatives either fled or went into exile.

Nevertheless important bills were passed during this time. These included the Public Tax Act, Bureau of Audit Act, the new election law, and the Education Bill.

Third Term (December 6th, 1914 – December 14th, 1915)
The Third Majlis did not last more than a year. Faced with the First Word War, Majlis representatives declared Iran’s neutrality. Nevertheless, Iran’s neutrality was blatantly transgressed by foreign expeditionary forces. The Czarist Russian Army expeditionary force left Qazvin for Tehran, bringing up the question of relocating the capital. It raised concerns and led to riots. A number of representatives moved to Qum and from there to Kermanshah. Majlis session could not be held due to lack of quorum. It finally adjourned in November 12th, 1915.

During this period, Majlis approved important laws such as the Military Conscription Act, Ministry of Finance constitution bill, and Real Estate tax law.

Fourth Term (June 21st, 1921 – June 20th, 1923)
Following a long interregnum , that lasted five years and seven months), the Fourth Majlis was inaugurated. Most of its time had been spent in tension and rancor.

The most valuable action taken was when it drafted and approved a bill submitted by Majlis majority leader Seyyed Hassan Modaress. The bill called for the abolition of the 1919 accord, signed between the Iranian Prime Minister and the British Government without Majlis knowledge. The accord had been put into effect before Majlis had any chance on debating it.

Moddares’ bill, once approved, was announced publicly and the British government was formally notified.

The most important legislations passed during this period had been:

Friendship Pact between Iran and the Soviet Union.

The Scholarship Bill for sending 60 students outside the country.

Property, Real Estate and Document Registry Bill.

Fifth Term (February 11th, 1924 – February 11th, 1924)
One of the tumultuous periods in Majlis, when a combination of generalissimo and foreign influence joined forces to put an end to the Qajar Dynasty. Independent Majlis representatives were harassed, intimidated and even assassinated in order to have the Minister of War, Reza Khan, installed to the throne.

Some of the important bills and legislations approved by Majlis during this period were:

Ten year exemption of agricultural and industrial machinery from customs levies and excises.

Commercial Law.

The bill of Military draft conscription.

General Penal Law.

Sixth Term (July 10th, 1926 – August 13th, 1928)
The most important event during this period had been the abolition of Capitulation on May 9th, 1927.

Some of the important bills and legislations approved by Majlis during this period were:

Permission granted to the Minister of Justice to make organizational, judicial and employment reforms in the Ministry of Justice.

Permission granted for establishment of Iran National Bank.

Dispatch of student to outside of country.

Procedure for Trial and Prosecution of Ministers by Jury.

Seventh Term (October 6th, 1928 – November 5th, 1930)
Majlis granted the right of issuing currency to the Iran National Bank (Bank Melli Iran). This task used to be carried out by Iran Royal Bank.

Among the important bills and legislations approved by Majlis during this period were:

Prohibition of Slave trade within Iranian Territory by which any slave entering the country would be automatically emancipated.

Permission granted for formation of Agricultural Bank.

Eight Term (December 15th, 1930 – January 14th, 1933)
During this period the Minister of Treasury proposed that Darcy License , which monopolized the Iranian oil fields, be cancelled.

The most important bills passed by Majlis at this time were:

Granting the exclusive right of foreign trade to the government.

Permission granted to exchange protocols for the liquidation of Indo-European Telegraph in Iran.

Legal verdict confirming government decision to Terminate Darcy License.

Ninth Term (March 15th, 1933 – April 10th, 1935)
The period saw negotiations with the British government over petroleum. It led to a new agreement. The Tehran University was inaugurated on February 4th, 1936.

Some of the most important legislations were:

Granting of Petroleum License to Iran-o-British Petroleum Company in May 1934.

Permission granted for forming of Tehran University.

Tenth Term (June 6th, 1935– June 12th, 1937)
The most important event during this period had been negotiations for the signing of non-aggression pact between Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq.

The most important legislations ratified were:

Formation of Iranian Government Railway Establishment.

Granting of petroleum license in parts of East and North-Eastern territories to Iran-American Oil Company.

Eleventh Term (September 11th, 1937 – September 18th, 1939)
The Second World War conflagrated at this time. Iran proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict.

Among the important bills and legislations approved by Majlis during this period were:

Formation of Ministry of Commerce.

Formation of Ministry of Industry.

Ratification of the non-aggression pact among Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq (The Saad Abbad Pact).

Census Law.

Twelfth Term (October 25th, 1940– October 30th, 1941)
Numerous social and economic problems arising from the Second World War gripped the country. While Iran had declared its neutrality, Soviet Union and Britain blatantly disregarded it and sent in their troops into Iran under the pretext of supposed Reich influence in Iran.

During an emergency session on September 17, 1941, Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza who was sworn in as the new monarch on the next day. Meanwhile with the Generalissimo Reza Khan out of the way, Majlis passed a bill of pardon and clemency for a number of political and general sentences.

Thirteenth Term (November 13th, 1941 – November 23rd, 1943)
This period coincided with the Tehran Conference attended by the head of states of Britain, Soviet Union and United States, where the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran was guaranteed.

Important bills and legislations approved during this period were:

Permission for exchange of concord with Soviet and British government.

Permission to employ Dr. Millipso, the General Director of Treasury and delineation of his scope of authority Formation of Ministry of Industry.

Amendments to Press Law.

Resolution to declare war against the German Reich.

Insurance security for government and private workers.

Taken from the Iran Chamber Society:

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/constitutional_revolution/constitutional_revolution.php

The Qajar Dynasty

2009-09-13T21:52:00.000-07:00

Qajar Dynasty

Agha Mohammad Khan

The Qajars were a Turkmen tribe that held ancestral lands in present-day Azerbaijan, which then was part of Iran. In 1779, following the death of Mohammad Karim Khan Zand, the Zand Dynasty ruler of southern Iran, Agha Mohammad Khan, a leader of the Qajar tribe, set out to reunify Iran. Agha Mohammad Khan defeated numerous rivals and brought all of Iran under his rule, establishing the Qajar dynasty. By 1794 he had eliminated all his rivals, including Lotf 'Ali Khan, the last of the Zand dynasty, and had reasserted Iranian sovereignty over the former Iranian territories in Georgia and the Caucasus. Agha Mohammad established his capital at Tehran, a village near the ruins of the ancient city of Ray (now Shahr-e Rey). In 1796 he was formally crowned as shah. Agha Mohammad was assassinated in 1797 and was succeeded by his nephew, Fath Ali Shah.

Fath Ali Shah, 1797 - 1834
Under Fath Ali Shah, Iran went to war against Russia, which was expanding from the north into the Caucasus Mountains, an area of historic Iranian interest and influence. Iran suffered major military defeats during the war. Under the terms of the Treaty of Golestan in 1813, Iran recognized Russia's annexation of Georgia and ceded to Russia most of the north Caucasus region. A second war with Russia in the 1820s ended even more disastrously for Iran, which in 1828 was forced to sign the Treaty of Turkmanchai acknowledging Russian sovereignty over the entire area north of the Aras River (territory comprising present-day Armenia and Republic of Azerbaijan).

Fath Ali's reign saw increased diplomatic contacts with the West and the beginning of intense European diplomatic rivalries over Iran. His grandson Mohammad Shah, who fell under the influence of Russia and made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Herat, succeeded him in 1834. When Mohammad Shah died in 1848 the succession passed to his son Naser-e-Din, who proved to be the ablest and most successful of the Qajar sovereigns.

Naser o-Din Shah

Naser o-Din Shah, 1848 - 1896
During Naser o-Din Shah's reign Western science, technology, and educational methods were introduced into Iran and the country's modernization was begun. Naser o-Din Shah tried to exploit the mutual distrust between Great Britain and Russia to preserve Iran's independence, but foreign interference and territorial encroachment increased under his rule. He contracted huge foreign loans to finance expensive personal trips to Europe. He was not able to prevent Britain and Russia from encroaching into regions of traditional Iranian influence. In 1856 Britain prevented Iran from reasserting control over Herat, which had been part of Iran in Safavid times but had been under non-Iranian rule since the mid-18th century. Britain supported the city's incorporation into Afghanistan; a country Britain helped create in order to extend eastward the buffer between its Indian territories and Russia's expanding empire. Britain also extended its control to other areas of the Persian Gulf during the 19th century. Meanwhile, by 1881 Russia had completed its conquest of present-day Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, bringing Russia's frontier to Iran's northeastern borders and severing historic Iranian ties to the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. Several trade concessions by the Iranian government put economic affairs largely under British control. By the late 19th century, many Iranians believed that their rulers were beholden to foreign interests.

Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, was the young prince Nasser o-Din's advisor and constable. With the death of Mohammad Shah in 1848, Mirza Taqi was largely responsible for ensuring the crown prince's succession to the throne. When Nasser o-Din succeeded to the throne, Amir Nezam was awarded the position of prime minister and the title of Amir Kabir, the Great Ruler.

Iran was virtually bankrupt, its central government was weak, and its provinces were almost autonomous. During the next two and a half years Amir Kabir initiated important reforms in virtually all sectors of society. Government expenditure was slashed, and a distinction was made between the privy and public purses. The instruments of central administration were overhauled, and the Amir Kabir assumed responsibility for all areas of the bureaucracy. Foreign interference in Iran's domestic affairs was curtailed, and foreign trade was encouraged. Public works such as the bazaar in Tehran were undertaken. Amir Kabir issued an edict banning ornate and excessively formal writing in government documents; the beginning of a modern Persian prose style dates from this time.

One of the greatest achievments of Amir Kabir was the building of Dar-ol-Fonoon, the first modern university in Iran. Dar-ol-Fonoon was established for training a new cadre of administrators and acquainting them with Western techniques. Amir Kabir ordered the school to be built on the edge of the city so it can be expanded as needed. He hired French and Russian instructors as well as Iranians to teach subjects as different as Language, Medicine, Law, Georgraphy, History, Economics, and Engeneering. Unfortunatelly, Amir Kabir did not live long enough to see his greatest monument completed, but it still stands in Tehran as a sign of a great man's ideas for the future of his country.

These reforms antagonized various notables who had been excluded from the government. They regarded the Amir Kabir as a social upstart and a threat to their interests, and they formed a coalition against him, in which the queen mother was active. She convinced the young shah that Amir Kabir wanted to usurp the throne. In October 1851 the shah dismissed him and exiled him to Kashan, where he was murdered on the shah's orders.

Mozaffar o-Din Shah

The Constitutional Revolution
When Naser o-Din Shah was assassinated by Mirza Reza Kermani in 1896, the crown passed to his son Mozaffar o-Din. Mozaffar o-Din Shah was a weak and ineffectual ruler. Royal extravagance and the absence of incoming revenues exacerbated financial problems. The shah quickly spent two large loans from Russia, partly on trips to Europe. Public anger fed on the shah's propensity for granting concessions to Europeans in return for generous payments to him and his officials. People began to demand a curb on royal authority and the establishment of the rule of law as their concern over foreign, and especially Russian, influence grew.

The shah's failure to respond to protests by the religious establishment, the merchants, and other classes led the merchants and clerical leaders in January 1906 to take sanctuary from probable arrest in mosques in Tehran and outside the capital. When the shah reneged on a promise to permit the establishment of a "house of justice", or consultative assembly, 10,000 people, led by the merchants, took sanctuary in June in the compound of the British legation in Tehran. In August the shah was forced to issue a decree promising a constitution. In October an elected assembly convened and drew up a constitution that provided for strict limitations on royal power, an elected parliament, or Majles, with wide powers to represent the people, and a government with a cabinet subject to confirmation by the Majles. The shah signed the constitution on December 30, 1906. He died five days later. The Supplementary Fundamental Laws approved in 1907 provided, within limits, for freedom of press, speech, and association, and for security of life and property. The Constitutional Revolution marked the end of the medieval period in Iran. The hopes for constitutional rule were not realized, however.

Mozaffar o-Din's son Mohammad Ali Shah (reigned 1907-09), with the aid of Russia, attempted to rescind the constitution and abolish parliamentary government. After several disputes with the members of the Majlis, in June 1908 he used his Russian-officered Persian Cossacks Brigade to bomb the Majlis building, arrest many of the deputies, and close down the assembly. Resistance to the shah, however, coalesced in Tabriz, Esfahan, Rasht, and elsewhere. In July 1909, constitutional forces marched from Rasht and Esfahan to Tehran, deposed the shah, and re-established the constitution. The ex-shah went into exile in Russia.

Ahmad Shah

Although the constitutional forces had triumphed, they faced serious difficulties. The upheavals of the Constitutional Revolution and civil war had undermined stability and trade. In addition, the ex-shah, with Russian support, attempted to regain his throne, landing troops in July 1910. Most serious of all, the hope that the Constitutional Revolution would inaugurate a new era of independence from the great powers ended when, under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, Britain and Russia agreed to divide Iran into spheres of influence. The Russians were to enjoy exclusive right to pursue their interests in the northern sphere, the British in the south and east; both powers would be free to compete for economic and political advantage in a neutral sphere in the center. Matters came to a head when Morgan Shuster, a United States administrator hired as treasurer general by the Persian government to reform its finances, sought to collect taxes from powerful officials who were Russian protégés and to send members of the treasury gendarmerie, a tax department police force, into the Russian zone. When in December 1911 the Majles unanimously refused a Russian ultimatum demanding Shuster's dismissal, Russian troops, already in the country, moved to occupy the capital. To prevent this, on December 20 Bakhtiari chiefs and their troops surrounded the Majles building, forced acceptance of the Russian ultimatum, and shut down the assembly, once again suspending the constitution. There followed a period of government by Bakhtiari chiefs and other powerful notables.

Ahmad Shah, was born 21 January 1898 in Tabriz, who succeeded to the throne at age 11, proved to be pleasure loving, effete, and incompetent and was unable to preserve the integrity of Iran or the fate of his dynasty. The occupation of Iran during World War I (1914-18) by Russian, British, and Ottoman troops was a blow from which Ahmad Shah never effectively recovered. With a coup d'état in February 1921, Reza Khan (ruled as Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1925-41) became the preeminent political personality in Iran; Ahmad Shah was formally deposed by the Majles (national consultative assembly) in October 1925 while he was absent in Europe, and that assembly declared the rule of the Qajar dynasty to be terminated. Ahamd Shah died later on 21 February 1930 in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.

Taken from the Iranian Chamber Society Website :http://www.iranchamber.com/history/constitutional_revolution/constitutional_revolution.php

Waitlisted Students

2009-09-01T21:45:00.000-07:00

So I spoke to the person in charge of class sizes. She's increased the class size by 10 for both the upper division and lower division sections and those of you on the wait-list should be moved in to the class by now.

Feel free to shoot me an email any hour of the day and I'll do my best to get back to you as soon as possible.

Welcome to the Class

2009-08-31T22:06:00.000-07:00

DeCal Course Syllabus – Iran: 30 Years of Revolution

Course Description

Iran 30 Years of Revolution serves as an introductory course on contemporary Iranian politics through examining the history of Iran over the past century and how events like the coup d’état against Dr. Mossadegh in 1953, and the near-decade long Iran-Iraq war have contributed to Iran’s current political atmosphere, both domestically and internationally. This course will also raise questions about issues that have brought Iran into the spotlight such as its nuclear program and the Shia’-Sunni divide.

Social issues like women’s, religious and gender rights will be addressed through examining Iran’s political structure and domestic policies. This decal also examines Iran’s role as a Great Shia Power in the Middle East and its growing influence in regional politics in regards to things suchas the current Iraq war and the para-military political group Hezbollah in Lebanon. No background on Iran or the Middle East is needed.

Documentaries, films, guest lecturers, and class discussions to convey and enhance the material will be utilized. The course will meet once a week for two hours.

Course Facilitator

Sammy Al-Shatti – s.alshatti@gmail.com

Course Requirements

Students will be required to attend every class meeting, submit a final paper, and respond to an online blog. With the use of power-point presentations, class will consist of organized units of lectures on topics of modern Iranian political history.

Readings:

The readings will be posted on the blog. Readings will be related to the lectures and will be posted after class.

Blog Participation:

Students will utilize the blog to post reading responses every other week. The blog will consist of reading related to the lectures in the form of news articles, videos, scholarly journals, as well as memoirs from major figures in Iranian political history.

Attendance:

You are allowed two absences without any prior notice to the facilitator. Any other absences will require prior instructor approval.

Grade Breakdown

Final Paper – 50%

Blog Participation/Response Paper – 25%

Attendance – 25%

NOTE: You must pass each portion of the class in order to receive a pass

grade in the class.

Course Schedule

Week 1 – Introduction to the Course.

Week 2 – Qajar Dynasty, Constitutional Revolution and Reza Shah

Week 3- The Coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh and CIA involvement

Week 4- The Shah: The White Revolution and SAVAK

Week 5 - The Islamic Revolution: The Rise of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Week 6- Development of Government Structure and the Iran-Iraq War

Week 7 – Religious Atmosphere in Iran: Religious Minorities and the

Sunni-Shia Divide.

Week 8 - The Cyclical Social Struggle: The Rise of Reformists.

Week 9– Persepolis

Week 10- The Era of Ultra-Conservatives and President Ahmadinejad

Week 11– Iran’s role in the Middle East: a new great power?

Week 12– Iran and the International Community: the Nuclear Controversy.

Week 13- The Green Revolution

Week 14- Marmulak

Iran Election Update

2009-07-20T18:05:00.000-07:00

For up to the minute updates about the protests in Iran:

2009-06-21T16:11:00.000-07:00

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/13/iran-demonstrations-viole_n_215189.html

http://iran.twazzup.com/?q=%23iranelection

http://niacblog.wordpress.com/

CNN has 24 hour coverage this weekend

Battle w/ Police - Tehran, Iran - June 20th 2009
by mightier-than

Protests Roil Tehran After Disputed Vote

2009-06-13T17:34:00.000-07:00

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html

Protests Roil Tehran After Disputed Vote

TEHRAN — The streets of Iran’s capital erupted in the most intense protests in a decade on Saturday, with riot police officers using batons and tear gas against opposition demonstrators who claimed that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had stolen the presidential election.

Witnesses reported that at least one person had been shot dead in clashes with the police in Vanak Square in Tehran. Smoke from burning vehicles and tires hung over the city late Saturday.

The Interior Ministry said Saturday afternoon that Mr. Ahmadinejad had won 62.6 percent of the vote, with Mir Hussein Moussavi, the top challenger, taking just under 34 percent. Turnout was a record 85 percent.

Mr. Moussavi, a former prime minister who had promised to reverse Mr. Ahmadinejad’s hard-line policies, declared himself the winner by a wide margin Friday night, charged widespread election irregularities and called on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, to intervene.

The landslide victory for Mr. Ahmadinejad, an intensely divisive figure here and abroad, came as a powerful shock to opposition supporters, who had cited polls showing that Mr. Moussavi had a strong lead in the final days of the campaign.

Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli said Saturday that such a lead was a misimpression based on Mr. Moussavi’s higher levels of support in the capital, and that he had less backing elsewhere.

Mr. Moussavi made clear in statements on Saturday that he rejected the results and called on supporters and fellow clerics to fight them. But there were no reports of any public appearances by him through the day, leading to rumors that he might have been arrested.

In a statement posted on his campaign Web site, Mr. Moussavi said: “Today the people’s will has been faced with an amazing incident of lies, hypocrisy and fraud. I call on my Iranian compatriots to remain calm and patient.”

But Ayatollah Khamenei closed the door to any appeals for intervention in a statement issued on state television on Saturday afternoon, congratulating Mr. Ahmadinejad on his victory and pointedly urging the other candidates to support him.

In a televised address to the nation Saturday night, Mr. Ahmadinejad called on the public to respect the results, and he denounced foreign diplomatic and journalistic criticism.

“All political and propaganda machines abroad and sections inside the country have been mobilized against the nation,” he said.

Mr. Moussavi’s defiance seemed to fuel street resistance by his supporters — a coalition including women, young people, intellectuals and members of the moderate clerical establishment — who had united in opposition to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s erratic economic stewardship, confrontational foreign policy and crackdown on social freedoms.

“Death to the coup d’état!” chanted a surging crowd of several thousand protesters, many of whom wore Mr. Moussavi’s signature bright green campaign colors, as they marched in central Tehran on Saturday afternoon. “Death to the dictator!”

Farther down the street, clusters of young men hurled rocks at a phalanx of riot police officers, and the police used their batons to beat back protesters. There were reports of demonstrations in other major Iranian cities as well.

The authorities closed universities in Tehran, blocked cellphone transmissions and access to Facebook and some other Web sites, and for a second day shut down text-messaging services.

As night settled in, the streets in northern Tehran that recently had been the scene of pre-election euphoria were lit by the flames of trash fires and blocked by tipped trash bins and at least one charred bus. Young men ran through the streets throwing paving stones at shop windows, and the police pursued them.

Earlier in the day, hurried meetings were reported among Iran’s leading political figures and clerics; some were said to be trying to influence Ayatollah Khamenei to intervene in a situation that could stain public confidence in the integrity of Iran’s elections.

But Saeed Leylaz, an economist and political analyst, said he believed that Ayatollah Khamenei’s statement would bring a resolution, even if demonstrations persisted for a few days. “This has put an end to political negotiations from above,” Mr. Leylaz said.

For the moment, Ayatollah Khamenei’s admonition did nothing to calm the opposition’s rage.

“The results of the 10th presidential election are so ridiculous and so unbelievable that one cannot write or talk about it in a statement,” said Mehdi Karroubi, a reformist cleric and candidate.

Mr. Karroubi came in last with 300,000 votes — far fewer than analysts had predicted. “It is amazing that the people’s vote has turned into an instrument for the government to stabilize itself,” he said.

The other candidate, Mohsen Rezai, got 680,000 votes, Interior Ministry officials said.

In 2005, when Mr. Karroubi was also a candidate for president, he accused the government of rigging the vote in Mr. Ahmadinejad’s favor. In that election, the government announced when polls closed that there would probably be a runoff between two of three candidates, a reform candidate and a former police chief.

But by 7 a.m. the next day, a spokesman for the Guardian Council, a clerical oversight panel that is not supposed to be involved in vote counting, announced that Mr. Ahmadinejad was in first place. Mr. Karroubi’s charges were never investigated.

The turmoil on Saturday followed an extraordinary night in which the Iranian state news agency announced that Mr. Ahmadinejad had won by a vast margin just two hours after the polls closed. The timing alone provoked deep suspicion here, because the authorities have never before announced election results until the following morning. Mr. Moussavi also announced Friday night that he believed he had won by a wide margin.

Mr. Moussavi also complained about irregularities and unfairness in the election, saying there had been a lack of ballots in many areas and that some of his campaign offices had been attacked and his Web sites shut down.

The official results prompted further skepticism, in part because Mr. Ahmadinejad was said to have won by large margins even in his opponents’ hometowns. Mr. Rezai’s hometown, for example, gave him less than a tenth of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s total there, the Interior Ministry said.

The issue of vote-rigging has often been raised in Iranian elections, but analysts have generally said the authorities can manipulate the results by only a few percentage points, leaving room for genuine democratic movements.

Iran’s clerical leaders often point to past reformist victories as proof of the Islamic Republic’s democratic legitimacy. Many reformists have boycotted votes in the past to avoid giving the clerics that satisfaction. Those reformists voted in large numbers this time, inspired by a vast popular movement that rose up to support Mr. Moussavi.

Their bitterness on Saturday at the unexpected results was correspondingly severe.

“We are not disposable things to be thrown away,” said Mahshid, 20, a student who declined to give her last name because she feared repercussions from the authorities. “From now on, we won’t vote. They have insulted our feelings of patriotism.”

Meanwhile, the working-class areas of southern Tehran where Mr. Ahmadinejad is popular were largely quiet, despite rumors of wild victory celebrations.

“There might be some manipulation in what the government has done,” said Maliheh Afrouz, 55, a supporter of Mr. Ahmadinejad clad in a black chador. “But the other side is exaggerating, making it seem worse than it really is.”

Khodafez -- Farwell

2009-05-08T00:22:00.000-07:00

Iran Election Report

2009-05-06T15:24:00.000-07:00

This is also from Press TV. Does this news excite you? Are there problems with the poll? What else strikes you about this report?

-Amir

Ahmadinejad tops Iran's pre-election polls

Mon, 04 May 2009 17:14:36 GMT

Iran's incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has emerged as the country's favorite followed by Mir-Hossein Mousavi in a pre-election survey.

According to an opinion poll carried out in 32 Iranian cities, 53.6% favor President Ahmadinejad as their chief executive while some 21.9% are set to vote for Mousavi.

About 3.8% of the respondents in cities except other than Tehran have made their decision to vote for Reformist Mehdi Karroubi and some 1.7% will vote for independent candidate Mohsen Rezaei.

Approximately 23.7% of the respondents in the Iranian capital will vote for the incumbent Principlist president while some 14.3% will pick Mousavi as president.

According to the nation-wide poll, 57.2% from Iranian cities will vote in the country's June 12 presidential elections and 21.9% will abstain from voting.

While 50.1% of the people of Tehran say they will vote, 30.6% will not vote.

Press TV Nuclear Report

2009-05-03T20:28:00.000-07:00

Hello all. I hope your work on the final paper is going well. Below is the Press TV clip I showed you guys in class. I would like you to react to the different arguments made in the piece. Do you agree or disagree with the slant of the report?

-Amir

Final Paper Spring 09

2009-04-20T17:53:00.000-07:00

Instructions: You must write a 3-5 page essay responding to one of the topics below. The essay must be double spaced, in 12 point Times New Roman font, with 1 inch margins. You must also have a cover page which will include your name, your student ID number, your blog screename, the number of the essay topic you are responding to, and the title of your essay. Additionally on the cover page you must also indicate which three postings you commented on in the blog (and any additional postings made to excuse absences etc…). Giving the title of the posting is enough. In order to pass this class you must complete three blog postings and this essay.

For the essays I want you to make a strong argument that you will support with evidence. Your argument must be made clear in your intro paragraph. You must also support every claim you make with a reference. (For example, you can’t just say a government is repressive without having something to back you up. Do this and you will fail!) You must cite an article from the reader at least once. You may also feel free to use any outside resource you please, except wikipedia. Citation can be done in a variety of ways, as long as it is consistent. However, you must include a bibliography at the end of your essay.

A hardcopy of your essay is due at the beginning of the final class session, May 7th 2009. E-mail copies will not be accepted! You may turn in the essay earlier if you please.

Topics:
1. Describe the system of concessions during the Qajar period in Iran. How did this impact the 1906 Constitutional Revolution?

2. Discuss how the U.S. government both benefited from, and was eventually repudiated for, the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammad Mossadegh. Be sure to include information regarding Cold War politics and how it legitimated the intervention.

3. Describe some of the events that contributed to the culmination of the Revolution of 1979. What inspired the Revolution? What components of the Shah’s program did people oppose?

4. “It was Iran against the world” is a statement that is constantly used to describe the Iran-Iraq war. To what extent is this true? Describe the support given to both Iran and Iraq during the war. Make sure to also discuss the controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.

5. Describe the powers of the Supreme Leader. How have his actions colored the presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad?

6. Should Iran be allowed to continue its nuclear program? Keep in mind Iran’s domestic needs, its stated intentions, and the possible threats the program poses.

7. With the election of Barack Hussein Obama as the 44th President of the United States, a possible new era of Iran-U.S. relations has begun. What do you think will change, if anything? Is this good or bad?

8. The Iranian people will soon be voting to decide the next President of Iran. It is up to you to convince them to vote for the candidate of YOUR choice. Pick from among the already announced candidates the one that you feel is the best choice for the Iranian people. Provide your reasoning in both the domestic and international context. This is both academic and persuasive. Feel free to get a little creative.

9. Should Iran be an Islamic Republic? Why or why not? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this form of government versus the benefits and drawbacks of other forms of government? You may suggest alternative government styles, but you must also comment on their feasibility in the Iranian context.

10. Topic of your choice. You must have this approved by me before writing your essay. Either speak to me in class or shoot me an e-mail.

Feel free to talk to me about your essays. I am always here to answer your questions. Good luck!

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

2009-04-11T15:45:00.000-07:00

Hello class. The topic for this week was, of course, President Ahmadinejad. You guys definitely have some strong opinions about him.

You will need to comment on Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans. It is included in the reader.

Basically, as an American, or at least someone who currently resides here, what is your reaction to this letter? What would you like to say to him as a reply?

Also, as the Iranian election approaches, I became curious to see your feelings of him as a candidate. Would you vote for him?

-Amir

Obama's Norouz Message to Iranians

2009-03-20T01:13:00.000-07:00

This is a very interesting and important message that the President has for Iranians. He even speaks Farsi at the end. Watch and discuss.

Have a great break!

-Amir

Divorce Iranian Style

2009-03-20T00:35:00.000-07:00

Below is the documentary we watched in class today, Divorce Iranian Style. Please finish watching and discuss your thoughts and reactions.

-Amir

An Islamic Democracy?

2009-03-19T01:06:00.000-07:00

Hello everyone. I hope you guys enjoyed the lecture on the Reformist movement. I am posting the clip of Khatami talking about the viability of democracy in Iran, particularly the brand of democracy he thinks Iran should have.

What are your reactions? Do you agree/disagree? Is this the only way Iran can become democratic, or is this not a way at all? Try to cite something from his book included in the reader.

-Amir

Iran-Iraq War

2009-03-09T17:59:00.001-07:00

This week we went over the Iran-Iraq war.

You can view a gallery of photos here.

For this post, I am interested in hearing some of your views on many of the controversial moves on behalf of Iran and the world during the war.

Without knowing the outcome, was the decision of Iran to counter-invade Iraq after two years the right one?

Do you feel it was right for the world, which felt threatened by Iran, to provide Iraq with both military support and chemical weapons?

How do you feel about Iran using human wave attacks, child soldiers, and human mine detectors (knowing that they helped Iran defend itself)?

In light of understanding more about the war, do you feel like you understand Iran's position (in terms of foreign policy) better?

Below is the catchy propaganda video with English subtitles. Comment on that also if you wish.

Have a good week guys!

-Amir

Revolution!

2009-03-02T21:27:00.000-08:00

This is a quick post that will probably elicit lengthy answers. I have two questions that I would like some of you to answer.

1. Without the benefit of hindsight, if you were an Iranian in 1979, do you believe you would have participated in the Revolution against the Shah? Why or why not?

2. Now with the benefit of hindsight, does your answer change? Why or why not?

I am interested to see what you guys think.

-Amir

Mossadegh

2009-02-23T13:33:00.001-08:00

To learn more about the CIA overthrow of Mossadegh, I would suggest checking out these links below.

NY Times: Secrets of History
National Security Archive: The Secret CIA history of the Iran Coup

For a posting comment, I would like you to answer any or all of these questions:

-Do you feel like you understand why Iran has acted the way it has in the last 30 years, specifically in relations to the U.S., by watching the video today?

-Do you think the U.S. was justified in taking Mossadegh out?

-Do you think Iranians share the blame for what happened to Mossadegh?

-Do you think the CIA should repeat what it did to Mossadegh to other countries, even Iran today?

Remember, the deadline for the first post is coming up.

-Amir

Attention Students

2009-02-18T19:16:00.000-08:00

Hello again guys. As promised, here is an update on the situation for class this week. The VCR is fixed. Come to class as usual.

As an aside, Rainn Wilson, better known as Dwight from the Office, has written a commentary on Bahaiis in Iran. Here is the link. You can comment on it if you wish. I, on the other hand, will be watching the Office.

-Amir

Competing Propoganda

2009-02-18T19:02:00.000-08:00

Hello class. I thought this would be an interesting idea. Below are two clips I showed you in class. One is the Iranian piece titled "Final Point," and the other is the Kuma war "Assault on Iran" video. Compare and contrast the videos, commenting on whatever you find interesting or important to discuss. I remain hyped for your comments.

-Amir

Rick Steves' Iran

2009-02-07T15:53:00.000-08:00

Hello class. Welcome to the first blog post opportunity. Below is the documentary we watched in class. Finish watching it and post up your impressions. Were you surprised by any of the information presented? How do you think the government supervision of the production affected the final product? Is Rick Steves a little off?

-Amir

Spring 09 Syllabus

2009-02-04T15:55:00.000-08:00

Course Description
This course serves as an introduction to modern Iranian politics in which no prior knowledge of Iran or the greater Middle East is required. It follows the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution and describes the outcomes that have spiraled into the headlines of today. Key topics of discussion include the coup d'etat against Prime Minister Mossadegh (1953), the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Reform Movement, and Iran’s rise to regional superpower. Important current events to be covered will be Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s role in Iraq, and the Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East. Documentaries, films, guest lectures, participation in the class blog, and class discussions are integral parts of this decal. Class will meet every Thursday from 6:30 to 8:30 PM.

Course Coordinator Amir Abadi - amirabadi@berkeley.edu

Course Requirements:

Readings
A reader comprised of short summaries and academic articles will offer the students a background to all the topics mentioned above. Specific sources for the reader are listed in the reading list. Additional readings may be handed out in class.

Final Paper
The final paper is a 3–5 page essay. Topics will be handed out two weeks prior to the final class meeting.

Blog Participation
You must submit a one paragraph response on the blog every four weeks during the course of the semester. Three blog postings are required to pass the course. You can only respond to the topics offered in each 4 week period (responses to topics that are from a prior 4 week period are encouraged but will not count for a grade). Your responses must be critical and engaging.

The blog can be found at http://iran-decal.blogspot.com.

Grading
Final Paper (50%), Blog Participation (25%), Attendance (25%)
NOTE: YOU MUST RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY GRADE IN ALL THREE COMPONENTS IN ORDER TO PASS THE COURSE. YOU CANNOT MISS MORE THAN ONE CLASS MEETING WITHOUT THE INSTRUCTOR’S PRIOR APPROVAL.

Schedule

Week 1: Introduction; overview of the course

Week 2: Iran 1850-1953; The Great Game, the Constitutional Revolution, and a period of ineffectiveness
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 1, 7-15
Yann, Richard. Shi’ite Islam pp. 1-14.
Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between the Revolutions pp. 50-101

Week 3: The coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh; documentary screening, The CIA and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 19-21
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup. Forward, Ch.13.
Blum, William. Killing Hope. pp. 64-72.

Week 4: The Shah and the Iranian Revolution; documentary screening, Iran: A Revolution Betrayed
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 20-29
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. pp. 101-129, 175-179
Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Ch. 1.

Week 5: The Iran-Iraq War
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 30-32 & 62-63
Hiro, Dilip. “The Iran-Iraq War,” from Iran and the Arab World, pp. 43-67

Week 6: Contemporary Iranian government structure: a quasi-democratic theocracy
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 46-49
Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Epilogue. pp. 132-143
Ganji, Akbar. The Latter-Day Sultan. 45-66

Week 7: Spotlight on Human Rights in Iran; documentary screening, Divorce Iranian Style

Week 8: Rise and fall of the reformists
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 36-37
Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty, and Development. pp. 3-16. & 135-153 Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes." Middle East Journal, Winter 2006
Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance. Ch. 18

Week 9: Ahmadinejad and the rise of ultra-conservatives
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 37-38
Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans

Week 10: Iran: Middle Eastern Superpower?; documentary screening, Frontline: Showdown With Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 66-81
Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival. Ch. 8
Klein, Joe. “Nation: Iran” Time Magazine, December 17, 2007. pp. 32-36.
Baer, Robert. The Devil we Know. Ch. 2, Ch. 11

Week 11: Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 50-56
Timmerman, Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis. Ch.26
Ritter, Scott. Target Iran. Conclusion.

Week 12: Guest Lecture, topic of the lecture to be announced two weeks prior.
۞ Final paper topics handed out

Week 13: Final class meeting
۞ Final papers due

Welcome Spring 09 Students!

2009-01-12T02:39:00.000-08:00

First class meeting on Thursday January 29th, at 6:30 PM in 2040 VLSB . This course is 2 units which are offered in two versions, 98 and 198. The course can only be taken as P/NP with the class meetings on Thursdays 6:30- 8:30 PM in 2040 VLSB.

If you have 59 units or less of coursework completed sign up for PS98 with ccn 71476 . If you have 60 units or more, sign up for PS198 with ccn 72353. Everyone should sign up for 2 units.

If you sign up on telebears, but do not appear on the first day of class, you will be dropped.

I look forward to seeing you in class!

-Amir

Class Picture Fall 08

2008-12-10T20:24:00.000-08:00

Thanks for a great semester guys!

-Amir

Children of Heaven

2008-11-30T22:57:00.001-08:00

Hi guys. I hope those of you who stuck around and watched Children of Heaven enjoyed it. (Who else totally hated that kid who pushed down the main character during the race?)

Much like the previous Persepolis post, I want to know what you thought about this film and its themes. How does it connect to some of the themes we have spoken about in class? For some of you that had little contact with Iranian culture before, what are you taking away from this film? Once again, no plot summary guys.

-Amir

Obama's Approach To U.S. Relations With Iran

2008-11-30T22:39:00.000-08:00

Hello class. I hope you all had a great Thanksgiving. This link will direct you to an NPR program on what Obama may do about Iran. It features both Ted Koppel and Zbigniew Brzezinski (former national security adviser to President Carter.) Listen to the program and post your reactions. Do you agree with these men? Disagree? How about those who called in? Also read some of the comments left on NPR's site. What are your reactions to them?

-Amir

Final Paper Fall 08

2008-11-19T12:40:00.001-08:00

Instructions: You must write a 3-5 page essay responding to one of the topics below. The essay must be double spaced, in 12 point Times New Roman font, with 1 inch margins. You must also have a cover page which will include your name, your student ID number, your blog screename, the number of the essay topic you are responding to, and the title of your essay. Additionally on the cover page you must also indicate which three postings you commented on in the blog (and any additional postings made to excuse absences etc…). Giving the title of the posting is enough. In order to pass this class you must complete three blog postings and this essay.

For the essays I want you to make a strong argument that you will support with evidence. Your argument must be made clear in your intro paragraph. You must also support every claim you make with a reference. (For example, you can’t just say a government is repressive without having something to back you up. Do this and you will fail!) You must cite an article from the reader at least once. You may also feel free to use any outside resource you please, except wikipedia. Citation can be done in a variety of ways, as long as it is consistent. However, you must include a bibliography at the end of your essay.

A hardcopy of your essay is due at the beginning of the final class session, Dec 9th 2008. E-mail copies will not be accepted! You may turn in the essay earlier if you please.

Topics:
1. Describe the system of concessions during the Qajar period in Iran. How did this impact the 1906 Constitutional Revolution?

2. Discuss how the U.S. government both benefited from, and was eventually repudiated for, the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammad Mossadegh. Be sure to include information regarding Cold War politics and how it legitimated the intervention.

3. Describe some of the events that contributed to the culmination of the Revolution of 1979. What inspired the Revolution? What components of the Shah’s program did people oppose?

4. “It was Iran against the world” is a statement that is constantly used to describe the Iran-Iraq war. To what extent is this true? Describe the support given to both Iran and Iraq during the war. Make sure to also discuss the controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.

5. Describe the powers of the Supreme Leader. How have his actions colored the presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad?

6. Make a judgment on Ahmadinejad’s tenure as the President of Iran. What have been his accomplishments and what have been his mistakes? Be sure to discuss both his domestic and foreign agendas.

7. Should Iran be allowed to continue its nuclear program? Keep in mind Iran’s domestic needs, its stated intentions, and the possible threats the program poses.

8. With the election of Barack Hussein Obama as the 44th President of the United States, a possible new era of Iran-U.S. relations has begun. What do you think will change, if anything? Is this good or bad?

9. Should Iran be an Islamic Republic? Why or why not? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this form of government versus the benefits and drawbacks of other forms of government? You may suggest alternative government styles, but you must also comment on their feasibility in the Iranian context.

10. Topic of your choice. You must have this approved by me before writing your essay. Either speak to me in class or shoot me an e-mail.

Feel free to talk to me about your essays. I am always here to answer your questions. Good luck!

-Amir

"Salaam to Haj Agha Obama!"

2008-11-06T13:12:00.000-08:00

Hello class.

The title of this post comes from the Iranian reaction to President-elect Barack Hussein Obama's victory.

Read this TIME.com article regarding the new possibilities for Iran-US relations. Do you think the optimism is warranted? Is this a good thing for either country? What are your other reactions?

I am excited to hear your thoughts.

-Amir

President Ahmadinejad

2008-11-02T15:33:00.000-08:00

Hello class. The topic for this week was, of course, President Ahmadinejad. You guys definitely have some strong opinions about him.

You will need to comment on Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans. It is included in the reader.

Basically, as an American, or at least someone who currently resides here, what is your reaction to this letter? What would you like to say to him as a reply?

Be sure to come up with some issues that came up this week in lecture.

Don't forget to vote this Tuesday! (Doesn't matter who you vote for; just do it!)

-Amir

Khatami on democracy

2008-10-22T14:19:00.000-07:00

What are your reactions? Do you agree/disagree? Is this the only way Iran can become democratic, or is this not a way at all? Try to cite something from his book included in the reader.

Don't forget that you need to post by next week...

-Amir

How Important is Iran's President?

2008-10-14T22:24:00.000-07:00

Hey guys. Today there was quite a discussion regarding the role of Iran's President, his powers, and his relation to the Supreme Leader. It got a little heated when someone asked if it was appropriate for the media to focus so much on President Ahmadinejad since he has so few powers. I had to stop the conversation because it was taking too much class time, but as promised, you can debate the question right here. What do you guys think? You can also comment on McCain's view on the situation, which is posted below. Don't be afraid to mix it up with each other, just keep things civil.

See you next week!

-Amir

Iran-Iraq War

2008-10-09T11:43:00.000-07:00

This week we went over the Iran-Iraq war.

You can view a gallery of photos here. You can also view the surprisingly catchy Iranian propaganda song and video here.

For this post, I am interested in hearing some of your views on many of the controversial moves on behalf of Iran and the world during the war. Once again you can answer as many of these questions as you like.

Without knowing the outcome, was the decision of Iran to counter-invade Iraq after two years the right one?

Do you feel it was right for the world, which felt threatened by Iran, to provide Iraq with both military support and chemical weapons?

How do you feel about Iran using human wave attacks, child soldiers, and human mine detectors (knowing that they helped Iran defend itself)?

In light of understanding more about the war, do you feel like you understand Iran's position (in terms of foreign policy) better?

Have a good week guys!

-Amir

Persepolis

2008-10-09T11:37:00.001-07:00

Hey guys. I hope you liked the movie --- I saw a couple of tears in the audience.

For this post, let me know what you thought about the film and its themes. How does it connect to some of the themes we have spoken about in class? For some of you that had little contact with Iranian culture before, what are you taking away from this film? Please no plot summary guys.

-Amir

Ahmadinejad on Larry King

2008-09-25T13:07:00.000-07:00

Below are the three parts of Ahmadinejad's recent interview with Larry King. Watch it and comment on whatever struck you.

-Amir

Revolution

2008-09-24T13:40:00.001-07:00

This is a quick post that will probably elicit lengthy answers. I have two questions that I would like some of you to answer.

1. Without the benefit of hindsight, if you were an Iranian in 1979, do you believe you would have participated in the Revolution against the Shah? Why or why not?

2. Now with the benefit of hindsight, does your answer change? Why or why not?

I am interested to see what you guys think.

-Amir

Cold War and Operation Ajax

2008-09-16T22:43:00.001-07:00

If you're interested about the beginnings of the Cold War in Iran, and want to hear a different view on operation ajax, read this article by Professor R.J. Rummel (same guy who created the term "democide") and comment on it.

-Amir

Mossadegh

2008-09-16T22:41:00.000-07:00

To learn more about the CIA overthrow of Mossadegh, I would suggest checking out these links below.

NY Times: Secrets of History
National Security Archive: The Secret CIA history of the Iran Coup

For a posting comment, I would like you to answer any or all of these questions:

-Do you feel like you understand why Iran has acted the way it has in the last 28 years, specifically in relations to the U.S., by watching the video today?

-Do you think the U.S. was justified in taking Mossadegh out?

-Do you think Iranians share the blame for what happened to Mossadegh?

-Do you think the CIA should repeat what it did to Mossadegh to other countries, even Iran today?

Remember, the deadline for the first post is coming up.

-Amir

Fall 08 Syllabus

2008-09-09T01:05:00.000-07:00

IRAN: 29 YEARS OF REVOLUTION- Syllabus

Course Description
This course serves as an introduction to modern Iranian politics in which no prior knowledge of Iran or the greater Middle East is required. It follows the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution and describes the outcomes that have spiraled into the headlines of today. Key topics of discussion include the coup d'etat against Prime Minister Mossadegh (1953), the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Reform Movement (1997), and the recent rise of the radical movement led by Ahmadinejad (2005). Important current events to be covered will be Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s role in Iraq, and the Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East. Documentaries, films, guest lectures, participation in the class blog, and class discussions are integral parts of this decal. Class will meet once a week for two hours.

Course Coordinator Amir Abadi - amirabadi@berkeley.edu

Course Requirements

Readings
A reader comprised of short summaries and academic articles will offer the students a background to all the topics mentioned above. Specific sources for the reader are listed in the reading list. Additional readings may be handed out in class.

Final Paper
The final paper is a 3–5 page essay. Topics will be handed out two weeks prior to the final class meeting.

Blog Participation
You must submit a one paragraph response on the blog every four weeks during the course of the semester. Three blog postings are required to pass the course. You can only respond to the topics offered in each 4 week period (responses to topics that are from a prior 4 week period are encouraged but will not count for a grade). Your responses must be critical and engaging.

The blog can be found at http://iran-decal.blogspot.com.

Grading
Final Paper (50%), Blog Participation (25%), Attendance (25%)
NOTE: YOU MUST RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY GRADE IN ALL THREE COMPONENTS IN ORDER TO PASS THE COURSE. YOU CANNOT MISS MORE THAN ONE CLASS MEETING WITHOUT THE INSTRUCTORS’ PRIOR APPROVAL.

Schedule

Week 1: Introduction; overview of the course

Week 2: Iran 1850-1953; The Great Game, the Constitutional Revolution, and a period of ineffectiveness

۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 1, 7-15

Week 3: The coup against Dr. Mossadegh; documentary screening, The CIA and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 19-21

Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup. Forward, Ch.13.

Blum, William. Killing Hope. pp. 64-72.

Week 4: The Shah and the Iranian Revolution; documentary screening, Iran: A Revolution Betrayed
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 20-29

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. pp. 101-129, 175-179

Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Ch. 1.

Week 5: The Iran-Iraq War: the longest conventional war of the 20^th century
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 30-32 & 62-63

Hiro, Dilip. “The Iran-Iraq War,” from Iran and the Arab World, pp. 43-67

Week 6: Contemporary Iranian government structure: a quasi-democratic theocracy

۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 46-49

Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Epilogue. pp. 132-143

Week 7: Rise and fall of the reformists

۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 36-37

Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty, and Development. pp. 3-16. & 135-153 Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes." Middle East Journal, Winter 2006

Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance. Ch. 18

Week 8: Ahmadinejad and the rise of ultra-conservatives
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 37-38

Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans

Week 9: Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 50-56

Timmerman, Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis. Ch.26

Ritter, Scott. Target Iran. Conclusion.

Week 10: Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East; documentary screening, Frontline: Showdown With Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 66-81

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival. Ch. 8

Klein, Joe. “Nation: Iran” Time Magazine, December 17, 2007. pp. 32-36.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Ch. 10

Week 11: Guest Lecture, topic of the lecture to be announced two weeks prior.
۞ Final paper topics handed out

Week 12: Student chosen topic

Week 13: Final class meeting

۞ Final papers due

Welcome Fall 08 Students!

2008-08-12T21:10:00.000-07:00

First class meeting on Tuesday September 2nd, at 6 PM in 160 Kroeber. This course is 2 units which are offered in two versions, 98 and 198. The course can only be taken as P/NP with the class meetings on Tuesdays 6:00- 8:00 PM in 160 Kroeber.

Show up on the first day of class for the CCN#.

Class Picture

2008-05-01T02:18:00.000-07:00

ISAA Movie Night will take place May 1st at 8pm in 185 Barrows.
The film will be "Mehman-e Maman."

Thanks for a great semester!

Reminder: Final papers due tomorrow

2008-04-28T13:20:00.000-07:00

Hey guys. As the title suggests, we want to remind you that the final papers are due tomorrow. It is not to late to ask questions, so feel free to e-mail us with any. Don't forget to make all your blog postings. Good luck and we look forward to seeing you tomorrow.

-Amir

Obliterating Iran?

2008-04-22T22:30:00.000-07:00

This is the last blog posting option. There has been a lot of talk about Iran on the campaign trail. Hillary Clinton in the last few days has made some controversial statements about Iran. Just give us your reaction to this video clip.

-Amir

Jobrani for none; Class cancelled

2008-04-19T18:22:00.000-07:00

Hey guys. Bad news. Maz Jobrani can't make it out to Berkeley.

I sincerely apologize for letting you guys down on this. I am as disappointed as you. As a consolation, class is cancelled this Tuesday in order to give you guys some more time to work on your final papers.

If you need any help on the papers do not hesitate to e-mail either me or Keyan. I look forward to seeing you guys soon, and once again my apologies.

-Amir

Marmulak/Lizard

2008-04-15T20:45:00.000-07:00

I hope you all enjoyed the film we screened today.

Let us know what you thought about the film and its themes. How does it connect to some of the themes we have spoken about in class? For some of you that had little contact with Iranian culture before, what are you taking away from this film? Please no plot summary guys.

Good luck on your papers and we will keep you posted on the status of Mr. Maz Jobrani.

-Amir

Final Paper Spring 08

2008-04-15T14:18:00.000-07:00

Instructions: You must write a 3-5 page essay responding to one of the topics below. The essay must be double spaced, in 12 point Times New Roman font, with 1 inch margins. You must also have a cover page which will include your name, your student ID number, your blog screename, the number of the essay topic you are responding to, and the title of your essay. Additionally on the cover page you must also indicate which three postings you commented on in the blog (and any additional postings made to excuse absences etc…). Giving the title of the posting is enough. In order to pass this class you must complete three blog postings and this essay.

For the essays we want you to make a strong argument which you will support with evidence. Your argument must be made clear in your intro paragraph. You must also support every claim you make with a reference. (For example, you can’t just say a government is repressive without having something to back you up.) You must cite an article from the reader at least once. You may also feel free to use any outside resource you please, except wikipedia. You must include a bibliography at the end of your essay.

A hardcopy of your essay is due at the beginning of the final class session, April 29th 2008. E-mail copies will not be accepted. You may turn in the essay earlier if you please.

Topics:
1. Describe the system of concessions during the Qajar period in Iran. How did this impact the 1906 Constitutional Revolution?

2. Discuss how the U.S. government both benefited from, and was eventually repudiated for, the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammad Mossadegh. Be sure to include information regarding Cold War politics and how it legitimated the intervention.

3. Describe some of the events that contributed to the culmination of the Revolution of 1979. What inspired the Revolution? What components of the Shah’s program did people oppose?

4. “It was Iran against the world” is a statement that is constantly used to describe the Iran-Iraq war. To what extent is this true? Describe the support given to both Iran and Iraq during the war. Make sure to also discuss the controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.

5. Describe the powers of the Supreme Leader. How have his actions colored the presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad?

6. Make a judgment on Ahmadinejad’s tenure as the President of Iran. What have been his accomplishments and what have been his mistakes? Be sure to discuss both his domestic and foreign agendas.

7. Should Iran be allowed to continue its nuclear program? Keep in mind Iran’s domestic needs, its stated intentions, and the possible threats the program poses.

8. Discuss the American media’s current portrayal of Iran and its government. How accurate is the portrayal? What are the consequences of this portrayal?

9. Should Iran be an Islamic Republic? Why or why not? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this form or government versus the benefits and drawbacks of other forms of government? You may suggest alternative government styles, but you must also comment on their feasibility in the Iranian context.

10. Topic of your choice. You must have this approved by us before writing your essay. Either speak to us in class or give us an e-mail.

Feel free to talk to us about your essays. We are always here to answer your questions. Good luck!

-Amir

Human Rights Abuse in Iran

2008-04-08T20:39:00.000-07:00

Tonight we were confronted by a very sticky, yet important, issue in Iran: human rights abuses. What was said is that the Iranian government has systematically tortured, jailed and executed dissidents without due process of law in many cases. But there's much more to it than that and I don't feel like we addressed your questions sufficiently. So I feel obligated at this point to direct you to more reliable, substantive sources. Check out this coverage by the Human Rights Watch. Also, check out this short article by Amnesty International. If you're interested in writing about this for your final paper, please email us with you specific topic.

Again, I encourage ALL of you to search further in the topic of human rights in Iran. A lot is shrouded in mystery, but most of the cases cannot be denied by the Islamic Republic.

- Keyan

Iran's Nuclear Challenge

2008-04-01T21:52:00.000-07:00

Hey Class,

This week's topic was Iran's highly-contested nuclear program. Unfortunately, we had to condense our lecture into 2 hours, so we weren't able to listen to all your questions, concerns and opinions. Now you have the opportunity express them in your comments. If needed, here are some questions to guide you:

- Dariush Zahedi said that Iran might be trying to "pre-empt a preemptive strike." Do you think this is a good idea? What are some of the consequences?

- How does the nuclear issue relate to, and shape, the national psyche?

- What are some of the domestic economic benefits? (Please assume that Iran will not invest in it's capacity to refine oil and will continue importing.)

- Lastly, how does this issue impact the delicate balance of powers in the region? What could happen if the United States (or Israel, or both) strikes Iran?

See you next week,

Keyan

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

2008-03-18T21:10:00.000-07:00

Hello class. The topic for this week was, of course, President Ahmadinejad. You guys definitely have some strong opinions about him.

You will need to comment on Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans. The link to it is on the left, under the link menu.

Basically, as an American, or at least someone who currently resides here, what is your reaction to this letter? What would you like to say to him as a reply?

Be sure to come up with some issues that came up this week in lecture.

Have a good break!

-Amir

The Rise and Fall of the Reformists

2008-03-18T11:19:00.000-07:00

This week consisted of Khatami and the reform movement in Iran. For this post, you will need to answer at least one of the following three questions:

1. Describe some of the impediments Khatami experienced during his presidency. Why did the reformists "fall," so to speak? What is it about the Iranian power structure that hindered his efforts?

2. Do you feel that the "dialogue of civilizations" is an idea that can succeed in the world we live in? Does it deviate from our Western mode of thinking? Use citations from Khatami's text, located in the reader.

3. Do you think Khatami made the right choice by not overtly supporting the student uprising of 1999? What could have been some consequences?

A Glimpse into Friday's Parliamentary Elections

2008-03-12T13:02:00.000-07:00

Here are the voices of five Iranian voters who during the course of their interviews reveal their political preferences and are critical of the election process. The content of the interviews is related to what I was saying about ex-President Khatami and his reformist bloc during yesterday's lecture. You can still find indications of people investing confidence and hope in the reformist candidates (who have been extremely limited due to the Guardian Council's disqualifications), but are mostly skeptical about their chances of being able to implement bills that would change the system.
Let us know what you think of these interviews either through the comments section on this blog or in class on Tuesday!
The interviews can be accessed through: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/7256509.stm
- Keyan

Iran: New parliment, new policies?

2008-03-04T22:36:00.000-08:00

Hey guys. I'm sorry we couldn't finish the lecture today, its apparent that I talk too much.

This article is from the Economist, and it ties quite nicely into the contemporary Iranian government structure that we were talking about today. It also serves to give you guys a taste of what is to come in the future of the course.

Just read the article and give us your thoughts. You guys had some great comments this week so I trust that this will be interesting.

Good luck on midterms and see you next week.

-Amir

The Art of State Building

2008-02-28T14:13:00.000-08:00

If you remember from Tuesday, I was quite intrigued by the short video that said "the Iran-Iraq war saved the Islamic revolution."
Now my question to you is: to what extent is this true? Your reply should contain information about Khomeini's consolidation, the acceleration of organization in the military and the surge of nationalism.
If you disagree, you might be able to substantiate your claims by mentioning some economic variables (something I discussed briefly during lecture towards the end)

See you on Tuesday!

Keyan

The Iran-Iraq War

2008-02-26T22:58:00.000-08:00

This week we went over the Iran-Iraq war.

You can view a gallery of photos here. You can also view the surprisingly catchy Iranian propaganda song and video here.

For this post, I am interested to hear some of your views on many of the controversial moves on behalf of Iran and the world during the war. Once again you can answer as many of these questions as you like.

Without knowing the outcome, was the decision of Iran to counter-invade Iraq after two years the right one?

Do you feel it was right for the world, which felt threatened by Iran, to provide Iraq with both military support and chemical weapons?

How do you feel about Iran using human wave attacks, child soldiers, and human mine detectors (knowing that they helped Iran defend itself)?

In light of understanding more about the war, do you feel like you understand Iran's position (in terms of foreign policy) better?

Have a good week guys, keep on the lookout for more opportunities to post.

-Amir

Iran Nuclear Bid May Have Gone Past 2003

2008-02-25T16:24:00.000-08:00

VIENNA, Austria (AP) — Iran may have continued work on nuclear weapons past 2003, the year U.S. intelligence says such activities stopped, a senior British diplomat said Monday.

Simon Smith, the chief British delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, commented after an IAEA presentation of documentation that — if accurate — would strongly back U.S. claims that Iran at one point worked on programs linked to attempts to make nuclear weapons.

That assertion was also made by a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, summarized and made public late last year said. That report also said, however, that the Iranians froze such work in 2003.

Asked whether the information presented to the IAEA's 35 board member nations indicated that Tehran continued such activities past that date, Smith said: "Certainly some of the dates ... went beyond 2003."

He did not elaborate. Another diplomat at the presentation, who asked for anonymity because the IAEA meeting was closed, said some of the documentation focused on a 2004 Iranian report on alleged weapons activities. But she said it was unclear whether the project was being actively worked at then.

A senior diplomat inside the meeting said that among the material shown was an Iranian video depicting mock-ups of a missile re-entry vehicle.

He said IAEA Director General Oli Heinonen suggested the component — which brings missiles back into from the stratosphere — was configured in a way that strongly suggests it was meant to carry a nuclear warhead.

Smith and the senior diplomat both said the material shown to the board members came from a "multitude of sources," including information gathered by the agency and intelligence provided by the members themselves.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear monitor, released a report last week saying that suspicions about most past Iranian nuclear activities had eased or been laid to rest.

But the report also noted that Iran had rejected documents that link it to missile and explosives experiments and other work connected to a possible nuclear weapons program, calling the information false and irrelevant.

The report called weaponization "the one major ... unsolved issue relevant to the nature of Iran's nuclear program."

Most of the material shown to Iran by the IAEA on alleged attempts to make nuclear arms came from Washington, though some was provided by U.S. allies, diplomats told the AP. The agency shared it with Tehran only after the nations gave their permission.

**What does this mean to us? Will it have an impact on policy? Please post your replies.

- Keyan

Revolution

2008-02-25T01:39:00.000-08:00

This is a quick post that will probably elicit lengthy answers. I have two questions that I would like some of you to answer.

1. Without the benefit of hindsight, if you were an Iranian in 1979, do you believe you would have participated in the Revolution against the Shah? Why or why not?

2. Now with the benefit of hindsight, does your answer change? Why or why not?

I am interested to see what you guys think.

-Amir

Resistance to the Shah

2008-02-19T16:09:00.000-08:00

You were supposed to have read this article by Maziar Behrooz for today's class lecture. It analyzes the guerilla movements in Iran during the 1960s and 70s. A couple of questions to contemplate:

- How important was the role of the guerillas in creating resistance to the Shah's rule?

- To what extent were they successful? What were their mistakes?
Please reply to this entry with your thoughts.

- Keyan

Cold War and Iran

2008-02-17T21:25:00.000-08:00

-Amir

Mossadegh

2008-02-17T21:04:00.000-08:00

To learn more about the CIA overthrow of Mossadegh, I would suggest checking out these links below.

NY Times: Secrets of History
National Security Archive: The Secret CIA history of the Iran Coup

For a posting comment, I would like you to answer any or all of these questions:

-Do you feel like you understand why Iran has acted the way it has in the last 28 years, specifically in relations to the U.S., by watching the video today?

-Do you think the U.S. was justified in taking Mossadegh out?

-Do you think Iranians share the blame for what happened to Mossadegh?

-Do you think the CIA should repeat what it did to Mossadegh to other countries, even Iran today?

Remember, the deadline for the first post is coming up this Tuesday. Enjoy the rest of your break!

-Amir

Khomeini grandson returns to poll -- BBC reports

2008-02-13T12:13:00.000-08:00

The grandson of Iran's late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini has been reinstated as a candidate in the country's parliamentary elections.

Ruhollah Khomeini's grandson Ali Eshraghi, 39, said last week he had been disqualified after officials questioned his neighbours about him.

Candidates are vetted to check loyalty to Iran's Islamic revolutionary system. The main vetting body said it had reinstated 280 out of more than 2,200 mainly reformist banned candidates.

Altogether 7,168 candidates have been registered to stand.

Iranian media published the names of the candidates, following the Guardians Council's decision on Tuesday.

But correspondents say many prominent reformists remain disqualified, and officials have hinted that more candidates could be excluded.

The vetting process will continue for several weeks and the final list of approved candidates will be announced on 5 March, with the vote held on 14 March.

Reformists were defeated in 2004 after hundreds of such disqualifications.

The council, a hardline unelected body, has the final say over who can stand.

Ayatollah Khomeini, who died in 1989, became Iran's first Supreme Leader after the 1979 Islamic revolution and instituted the current clerically-led system.

Khomeini's Grandson Disqualified From Majlis Elections

2008-02-12T15:53:00.000-08:00

TEHRAN (AFP)--The Iranian authorities have disqualified the grandson of late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from standing in parliamentary elections, the press reported Wednesday.

Ali Eshraghi, was one of more than 2,000 mainly reformist candidates vetoed by an interior ministry committee for failing to adhere to the constitution's strict rules for candidates in the first phase of vetting.

Eshraghi, the son of Khomeini's son-in-law Ayatollah Shahaboddin Eshraghi, said he was closer to reformists than to other Iranian factions.

He said he had been disqualified after the authorities asked his neighbors detailed questions about his life during their investigations. He said he had been informed of the decision by letter.

"This does not benefit the system and the expansion of democracy. This narrow- mindedness does not suit the Islamic Republic of Iran," Eshraghi told the moderate daily Kargozaran.

"Some of the neighbors told me that inspectors from the supervisory committee asked them about my private life," Eshraghi complained. "I was shocked to discover that the questions tackled whether I prayed daily, if I fasted, if I wore a suit, if I shaved, and if I smoked and what kind of car I drove.

"And then the inspectors would ask the neighbors if they knew that I was the imam's (Khomeini's) grandson and the neighbors would say, 'Well, if you know, then why did you ask?'

"I did not lodge a complaint against the decision and I accepted it as it was, " he said. "If the credentials of the imam's grandson are not validated who should I complain to?"

Eshraghi said he had informed supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of his candidacy and had even held a one hour discussion with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

He said it had also been approved by Hassan Khomeini, another grandson of the revolutionary leader who oversees the literary legacy of Khomeini.

In order to pass the vetting process, candidates must meet a host of criteria, one of which is sufficient loyalty to the system of clerical leadership of Iran put in place by Khomeini. The final say over who can stand in the election lies with the hardline unelected vetting body, the Guardians' Council.

Ahead of the last elections in 2004, the Guardians' Council banned more than 2,000 candidates, leading the way for the conservatives to seize control of parliament from the reformists.

(from Nasdaq.com)

The Shia/Sunni Divide Revisited

2008-02-06T12:47:00.000-08:00

I found a great, simple description that synthesizes what Amir and I said last night in our lecture:

"Schisms appeared in Islam shortly after Muhammad's death. His followers elected a successor (Arabic Khalifa or Caliph), but violent factional disputes soon arose between them. The fourth Caliph, the Prophet's son-in-law Ali, was forced to abdicate and later murdered. This gave rise to the principal division within Islam--the majority of Sunnis, who accepts the orthodox Caliphs, and the minority of Shias, who believe that Ali was the true successor to Muhammad. Iran today is the principal Muslim country in which Shia Islam is the religion of the state."
(from Peter Mansfield, "the Ottoman Empire and Its Successors")

Hope this helps.

-KK

*This posting is not for comment*

Spring Syllabus

2008-02-03T23:13:00.000-08:00

Welcome to the Class! I hope you guys enjoyed the first day of lecture. Don't forget to sign up on telebears and pick up a reader from Copy Central. Heres to a good semester! -Amir

IRAN: 28 YEARS OF REVOLUTION- Syllabus

Course Description

This course serves as an introduction to modern Iranian politics in which no prior knowledge of Iran or the greater Middle East is required. It follows the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution and describes the outcomes that have spiraled into the headlines of today. Key topics of discussion include the coup d'etat against Prime Minister Mossadegh (1953), the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Reform Movement (1997), and the recent rise of the radical movement led by Ahmadinejad (2005). Important current events to be covered will be Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s role in Iraq, and the Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East. Documentaries, films, guest lectures, participation in the class blog, and class discussions are integral parts of this decal. Class will meet once a week for two hours.

Course Coordinators
Amir Abadi - amirabadi@berkeley.edu
Keyan Keihani - keihani@berkeley.edu

Course Requirements

Readings
A reader comprised of short summaries and academic articles will offer the students a background to all the topics mentioned above. Specific sources for the reader are listed in the reading list. Additional readings may be handed out in class.

Final Paper
The final paper is a 3–5 page essay. Topics will be handed out two weeks prior to the final class meeting.

Blog Participation
You must submit a one paragraph response on the blog every four weeks during the course of the semester. Three blog postings are required to pass the course. You can only respond to the topics offered in each 4 week period (responses to topics that are from a prior 4 week period are encouraged but will not count for a grade). Your responses must be critical and engaging.

The blog can be found at http://iran-decal.blogspot.com/.

Grading
Final Paper (50%), Blog Participation (25%), Attendance (25%) NOTE: YOU MUST RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY GRADE IN ALL THREE COMPONENTS IN ORDER TO PASS THE COURSE. YOU CANNOT MISS MORE THAN ONE CLASS MEETING WITHOUT THE INSTRUCTORS’ PRIOR APPROVAL.

Schedule
Week 1: Introduction; overview of the course

Week 2: Iran 1850-1953; The Great Game, the Constitutional Revolution, and a period of ineffectiveness
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 1, 7-15

Week 3: The coup against Dr. Mossadegh; documentary screening, The CIA and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 19-21
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup. Forward, Ch.13.
Blum, William. Killing Hope. pp. 64-72.

Week 4: The Shah and the Iranian Revolution; documentary screening, Iran: A Revolution Betrayed
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 20-29
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. pp. 101-129, 175-179
Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Ch. 1.
Behrooz, Maziar. “Iranian Revolution and the Legacy of the Guerrilla Movement” http://www.iranian.com/Behrooz/2004/September/Left/index.html

Week 5: The Iran-Iraq War: the longest conventional war of the century
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 30-32 & 62-63
Hiro, Dilip. “The Iran-Iraq War,” from Iran and the Arab World, pp. 43-67

Week 6: Contemporary Iranian government structure: a quasi-democratic theocracy
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 46-49
Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Epilogue. pp. 132-143

Week 7: Rise of the reformists
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 36-37
Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty, and Development. pp. 3-16. & 135-153 Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes." Middle East Journal, Winter 2006

Week 8: Ahmadinejad and the rise of ultra-conservatives
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 37-38
Ahmadinejad's letter to President Bush (link on blog)

Week 9: Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 50-56
Timmerman, Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis. Ch.26
Ritter, Scott. Target Iran. Conclusion.

Week 10: Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East; documentary screening, Frontline: Showdown With Iran
۞ Reading due: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 66-81
Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival. Ch. 8
Klein, Joe. “Nation: Iran” Time Magazine, December 17, 2007. pp. 32-36.

Week 11: Guest Lecture, topic of the lecture to be announced two weeks prior.
۞ Final paper topics handed out

Week 12: Student chosen topic

Week 13: Final class meeting
۞ Final papers due

Welcome Spring 08 Students!

2008-01-15T14:46:00.000-08:00

First class meeting on Tuesday January 29th, at 6 PM in 2 Le Conte.

This course is 2 units which are offered in two versions, 98 and 198. The course can only be taken as P/NP with the class meetings on Tuesdays 6:00- 8:00 PM in 2 Le Conte.

If you have 59 units or less of coursework completed sign up for PS98 with ccn 72440. If you have 60 units or more, sign up for PS198 with ccn 72443. Everyone should sign up for 2 units.

If you sign up on telebears, but do not appear on the first day of class, you will be dropped.

We look foward to seeing you in class!

2007-12-10T15:58:00.001-08:00

Iran on the Recent U.S. Spy Report

2007-12-08T00:06:00.000-08:00

Class is over but the content cotinues. This is Iran's UN ambassador's reaction to the recent U.S. report on Iran's nuclear program.

Submitting Final Papers

2007-12-02T10:50:00.000-08:00

Please note that all students are required to submit a hard copy of the final exam tomorrow Monday December 3. Only if your situation is extreme and there is absolutely no way you can make it to class, there will be no excuse for your absence and we will not be accepting final exams via email attachment. Remember, the Political Science department requests a hard copy of the exams from the student facilitators to verify their students' presence in the class. We are not responsible for printing them out and will not be accepting late papers. Thanks and good luck.

Marmulak

2007-11-27T01:51:00.000-08:00

I hope you all enjoyed the film we screened today. I heard you guys laugh a lot, and I even saw some tears at the end.

This is your last posting opportunity. Let us know what you thought about the film and its themes. How does it connect to some of the themes we have spoken about in class? For some of you that had little contact with Iranian culture before, what are you taking away from this film? Please no plot summary guys.

Good luck on your papers and we will see you for the final time next week. Also we will probably post the grades up on the blog, so keep checking it out.

-Amir

Final Paper

2007-11-10T20:18:00.000-08:00

Instructions: You must write a 3-5 page essay responding to one of the topics below. The essay must be double spaced, in 12 point Times New Roman font, with 1 inch margins. You must also have a cover page which will include your name, your student ID number, your blog screename, the number of the essay topic you are responding to, and the title of your essay. Additionally on the cover page you must also indicate which three postings you commented on in the blog. Giving the title of the posting is enough. In order to pass this class you must have done three blog postings and this essay.

For the essays we want you to make a strong argument which you will support with evidence. Your argument must be made clear in your intro paragraph. You must also support every claim you make with a reference. (For example, you can’t just say a government is repressive without having something to back you up.) You must cite an article from the reader at least once. You can also feel free to use any outside resource you please, except wikipedia. You must include a bibliography at the end of your essay.

A hardcopy of your essay is due at the beginning of the final class session, December 3rd 2007. You may turn in the essay earlier if you please.

Topics:
1. Describe the system of concessions during the Qajar period in Iran. How did this impact the 1906 Constitutional Revolution?

2. Discuss how the U.S. government both benefited from, and was eventually repudiated for, the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammad Mossadegh. Be sure to include information regarding Cold War politics and how it legitimated the intervention.

3. Describe some of the events that contributed to the culmination of the Revolution of 1979. What inspired the Revolution? What components of the Shah’s program did people oppose?

4. “It was Iran against the world” is a statement that is constantly used to describe the Iran-Iraq war. To what extent is this true? Describe the support given to both Iran and Iraq during the war. Make sure to also discuss the controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.

5. Describe the powers of the Supreme Leader. How has his actions colored the presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad?

6. Make a judgment on Ahmadinejad’s tenure as the President of Iran. What have been his accomplishments and what have been his mistakes? Be sure to discuss both his domestic and foreign agendas.

7. Should Iran be allowed to continue its nuclear program? Keep in mind Iran’s domestic needs, its stated intentions, and the possible threats the program poses.

8. Discuss the American media’s current portrayal of Iran and its government. How accurate is the portrayal? What should we expect of the media? What is at stake?

9. Should Iran be an Islamic Republic? Why or why not? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this form or government versus the benefits and drawbacks of other forms of government? You may suggest alternative government styles, but you must also comment on their feasibility in the Iranian context.

10. Topic of your choice. You must have this approved by us before writing your essay. Either speak to us in class or give us an e-mail.

Feel free to talk to us about your essays. We are always here to answer your questions. Good luck!

The Iranian Challenge

2007-11-06T13:53:00.000-08:00

Please read this article by Trita Parsi before our foreign policy lecture.

Are his points compatible with what we've discussed in class?

Keyan

Khamenei on Nuclear Technology

2007-11-05T16:22:00.000-08:00

You can comment on this.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

2007-11-01T21:00:00.000-07:00

Hello class. The topic for this week was, of course, President Ahmadinejad. And with him comes your next chance for a posting comment.

You will need to comment on Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans. The link to it is on the left, under the link menu.

Basically, as an American, or at least someone who currently resides here, what is your reaction to this letter? What would you like to say to him as a reply?

Also, in preparation for next week, if you have the time I would suggest looking up some basic facts about the nuclear fuel cycle. This link may be able to help. It is a little technical, but just skimming it may give you some background knowledge and make this week's lecture a little easier to understand.

And finally, this is a link to a hilarious story about the FBI, falafel, and Iranian "terrorists" in the Bay Area. Falafel isn't even an Iranian dish! It's not for a comment credit, but it is good for a laugh.

See you on Monday!

-Amir

The Iranian Regime's Lobby in the U.S. vs the Israeli Lobby

2007-10-28T20:18:00.000-07:00

Here are a few links regarding both the Iranian Regime's Lobby in the U.S. and the Israeli Lobby in the U.S., which has taken a hard stance against Iran.

This link is about the Iranian Lobby in the U.S. It argues that "The Iranian regime has always tried to frame its confrontation with the international community and its own people, as a battle between Iran and Israeli."

This link summarises the key points made in the new book critical of the Israeli Lobby by John Maersheimer and Stephen Walt. They visited Berkeley just last week. I would suggest picking up the book because it has a chapter on Iran.

And finally, this is a link to AIPAC's (America's Pro-Israeli lobby) homepage. Their main story for today involves the sanctions on Iran.

Though this post does not count towards a blog posting comment, comments are welcome.

The Rise and Fall of the Reformists

2007-10-23T23:36:00.000-07:00

This week we talked about Khatami and the reform movement in Iran. For this post, you will need to answer one or more of the following three questions:

1. Describe some of the impediments Khatami experienced during his presidency. Why did the reformists "fall," so to speak?

2. Do you feel that the "dialogue of civilizations" is an idea that can succeed in the world we live in? How does it deviate from our Western mode of thinking? Use citations from Khatami's text, located in the reader.

3. Do you think Khatami made the right choice by not supporting the student uprising of 1999?

Iran-Iraq War

2007-10-09T18:23:00.000-07:00

This week we went over the Iran-Iraq war.

You can view a gallery of photos here. You can also view the surprisingly catchy Iranian propaganda song and video here.

Without knowing the outcome, was the decision of Iran to counter-invade Iraq after two years the right one?

Do you feel it was right for the world, which felt threatened by Iran, to provide Iraq with both military support and chemical weapons?

How do you feel about Iran using human wave attacks, child soldiers, and human mine detectors (knowing that they helped Iran defend itself)?

In light of understanding more about the war, do you feel like you understand Iran's position (in terms of foreign policy) better?

Have a good week guys, keep on the lookout for more opportunities to post.

-Amir

Back to Tehran

2007-10-08T15:33:00.000-07:00

Here you can read various opinions about Ahmadinejad after his visit to New York.

President Ahmadinejad at Columbia University

2007-09-29T23:47:00.001-07:00

You can comment on this along with most other posts below. -Amir

Interesting links

2007-09-28T11:44:00.001-07:00

Hey guys.

First I wanted to say that so far I have been very impressed by your comments. You guys all deserve praise for what you have done. Secondly, this post is not for comment. There's enough to comment on all ready. Though if you would like to comment, you are welcome, it just won't count towards the requirement. Basically I am just going to post some links to some interesting stories about the fallout of Ahmadinejad's visit. He seems to have almost broken the Internet in half. I'll add more links to this post if I see anything else of worth. I'm looking forward to reading more of your posts!

This is Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, on how he will deal with Iran if he becomes President.
This is the how Iran is becoming a major campaign issue in the upcoming presidential election.
This is a sampling of reactions from Iranian bloggers both inside and outside Iran to Ahmadinejad's visit.
This is from the Jerusalem post. At the end of the article seems to be Ahmadinejad's stance on Israel. Its not friendly, but its not exactly "wiping it off of the map" either.
This is about the media's "war blitz" against Iran. Its very interesting.
This is an article about how Iran, (in retaliation for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard being possibly labeled as a terrorist organization by the US), has labeled the CIA and the US Army as terrorist organizations.

And finally, this is a link to a video of Ahmadinejad at the UN.

See you all on Monday.

-Amir

Attention all new students

2007-09-26T18:37:00.001-07:00

Most likely we've been in some sort of e-mail correspondence, but to reiterate, please purchase the reader from Copy Central on Bancroft. Amir and I tried our hardest to minimize the cost without compromising the content. It contains a lot of useful readings and all the students are expected to participate in informed (that means doing the reading) discussion during lecture.
Also, I'm happy to say that I've seen an increase in the number of postings on this site. They've been great, guys! Keep up the good work.

Have a good weekend and be prepare to expand on the information about the Shah next week.

Keyan

Mossadegh and the CIA

2007-09-24T22:34:00.001-07:00

To learn more about the CIA overthrow of Mossadegh, and the man himself, I would suggest checking out these links below.

NY Times: Secrets of History
National Security Archive: The Secret CIA history of the Iran Coup
Wikipedia: Mossadegh Bio
Mossadegh Project: Official Site

For a posting comment, I would like you to answer any or all of these questions:

-Do you feel like you understand why Iran has acted the way it has in the last 28 years, specifically in relations to the U.S., by watching the video today?

-Do you think the U.S. was justified in taking Mossadegh out?

-Do you think Iranians share the blame for what happened to Mossadegh?

-Do you think the CIA should repeat what it did to Mossadegh to other countries, even Iran today?

You can post on any of the items we have posted so far, but make sure to do it by next Monday.

-Amir

Cold War in Iran

2007-09-24T21:48:00.000-07:00

If you're interested about the beginnings of the Cold War in Iran, read this article by Professor R.J. Rummel (same guy who created the term "democide") and comment on it.

Ahmadinejad In America

2007-09-23T19:13:00.000-07:00

Transcript: Ahmadinejad Interview

- Keyan

Iran's Plan for Iraq

2007-09-23T10:33:00.000-07:00

In this article on the Iran Press Service, Walid Phares describes Iran's mounting influence in Iraqi affairs and outlines a situation in which he calls a"projected reality if U.S. forces prematurely and abruptly withdraw from Iraq."

Before agreeing with or challenging his thoughts, please read some short details on his background at this Wikipedia post. If you choose to comment on this piece, please make a reasonable, erudite connection between his affiliations listed on Wikipedia and the frame of thought that's portrayed in the article on Iran Press Service.

Keyan Keihani

First Discussion Posting Chance

2007-09-19T22:40:00.000-07:00

Hey guys!

This is your first chance to do a discussion posting. Don't worry if you have nothing to say this time, there will be plenty of chances to come.

I have been given two links from some very nice students, I would like your comments to address both.

The first link has to do with the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He has requested to see Ground Zero in New York to pay his respects. Unsurprisingly, he was rejected. However the angry reaction to his request is very interesting. Here is the link. You can approach posting on it any way you want, but if you are stuck, think about this: Do you think the reaction is justified?

Secondly, a top U.S. Army General has recently stated that the U.S. and the world could live with a nuclear Iran. The link is here. What do you think about his comments?

I do know that we haven't gone over these issues yet, and that's why I have put it up. I want to see what you guys think going into the class. By the end of the semester it will be interesting to see if your opinions have changed.

As Keyan stated before, "A response that’s thoughtful and astute will be regarded higher than something that’s rushed and out of compulsion. Remember, intelligent debate is an integral component of this course." Be sure to put your full name on the post so we have an accurate count of how many posts people have done.

Also, the slides have been approved and they are up at www.decal.org/iran.

Finally I found this amusing video about Persians from the animated comedy American Dad. Its offensive, but strangely funny. Don't watch it if you are easily offended. And don't worry, you don't have to comment on it. This is the link. Enjoy. - Amir

Slides and other news

2007-09-18T20:16:00.000-07:00

Hello class,

I hope you all enjoyed the last lecture. We promise they won't be so text heavy again.

To reiterate some of the things Keyan said in his e-mail, the movie won the survey by one vote. Its a good movie and a good choice. Readers should be available at copy central. Just ask for the reader of PS 98/198. Also, if you didn't get an e-mail let us know so we can add you to the e-mail list.

On the links section to the right added a link to the facebook group of the class. Join up if you want to be a part of the community!

I have also posted the slides some of you requested to the decal organization's server. Apparently it needs to be approved by the decal board itself. In a few days, go to www.decal.org/iran and scroll to the bottom, the file should be uploaded by then. It will be titled "copy of lecture 2." In order for it to fit the size restriction I had to cut out a lot of the pictures. I am sorry about that.

Also as a note for everyone, we'll be updating this blog often with chances for you guys to post. So I would suggest just checking back often for a new posting. If there isn't one, there's always those youtube videos to watch.

Finally, someone from the class asked me to post some specific pictures. They are below.

-Amir

Welcome to the class / Syllabus

2007-09-12T00:08:00.000-07:00

Hello all. I hope you all enjoyed the first day of class. The site is still under construction for now, but on the right are randomly generating youtube videos, a news feed on Iranian stories in the news, and some links. We will be adding more features as we go along.

We heard that the decal website was down the first day of class. If this prevented people from knowing where the class was located we will allow them to sign up on telebears. Just remember to show up this Monday at 155 Kroeber at 6 or you will be dropped.

If you have 59 units or less of coursework completed sign up for PS98 with ccn 71483. If you have 60 units or more, sign up for PS198 with ccn 72632. Everyone should sign up for 2 units. Also if you are signing up be sure to pick up a reader at copy central.

We will announce the winner of the survey soon. Below is the syllabus for the course. Here's to a good semester. -Amir

IRAN: 28 YEARS OF REVOLUTION

Course Description

This course serves as an introduction to modern Iranian politics in which no prior knowledge of Iran or the greater Middle East is required. It follows the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution and describes the outcomes that have spiraled into the headlines of today. Key topics of discussion include the coup d'etat against Prime Minister Mossadegh (1953), the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Reform Movement (1997), and the recent rise of the radical movement led by Ahmadinejad (2005). Important current events to be covered will be Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s role in Iraq, and the Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East. Documentaries, films, guest lectures, participation in the class blog, and class discussions are integral parts of this decal. Class will meet once a week for two hours.

Course Coordinators

Amir Abadi - amirabadi@berkeley.edu
Keyan Keihani- keihani@berkeley.edu

Course Requirements
Readings
A reader comprised of short summaries and academic articles will offer the students a background to all the topics mentioned above. Specific sources for the reader are listed in the reading list. Additional readings may be handed out in class.

Final Paper
The final paper is a 3–5 page essay. Topics will be handed out two weeks prior to the final class meeting.

Blog Participation
You must submit 3, one paragraph responses on the blog during the course of the semester. You can only respond to the topics offered that week (responses to topics that are more than a week old are encouraged but will not count for a grade). Your responses must be critical and engaging. No more than one response per week will count for a grade.

Grading
Final Paper (50%), Blog Participation (25%), Attendance (25%)
NOTE: YOU MUST RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY GRADE IN ALL THREE COMPONENTS IN ORDER TO PASS THE COURSE. YOU CANNOT MISS MORE THAN ONE CLASS MEETING WITHOUT THE INSTRUCTORS’ PRIOR APPROVAL.

Schedule
Week 1: Introduction; overview of the course
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 1, 7-15

Week 2: The coup against Dr. Mossadegh; documentary screening, The CIA and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 19-21
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup. Forward, Ch.13.
Blum, William. Killing Hope. pp. 64-72.

Week 3: The reemergence of the Shah and the events leading up to the Iranian Revolution; documentary screening, Evolution of Revolution: Live from Tehran (ABC)
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 20-29
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. pp. 101-129

Week 4: The Iranian Revolution; documentary screening, Iran: A Revolution Betrayed
۞ Reading: Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism. Ch. 1.

Week 5: The Iran-Iraq War: the longest conventional war of the century
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 30-32 & 62-63

Week 6: Contemporary Iranian government structure: a quasi-democratic theocracy
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 46-49

Week 7: Rise of the reformists
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 36-37
Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty, and Development. pp. 3-16. & 135-153 Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes." Middle East Journal, Winter 2006

Week 8: Ahmadinejad and the rise of ultra-conservatives
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 37-38 & Ahmadinejad's letter to President Bush (link on blog)

Week 9: Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 50-56
Timmerman, Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis. Ch.26
Ritter, Scott. Target Iran. Conclusion.

Week 10: Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East
۞ Reading: Roraback, Amanda. Iran in a Nutshell. pp. 66-81

Week 11: Guest Lecture, topic of the lecture to be announced two weeks prior.
۞ Final paper topics handed out

Week 12: Student chosen topic

Week 13: Final class meeting
۞ Final papers due

Coming soon

2007-08-08T14:16:00.001-07:00

Blog is coming soon

First day of class is September 10th, 2007.
6:00- 8:00 PM in 155 Kroeber Hall
Course Control Number will be given out the first day of class.
Sorry, we can't reserve spots.

Looking forward to seeing you there.